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Introduction
In this thesis I analyze how financial markets characteristics and financial markets
conditions affects corporate innovation and the market for corporate control.
In the first chapter, I review the growing literature on finance and innovation. Focus-
ing on technological innovation, I survey numerous recent contributions on the relation
between arm’s-length financial systems and relationship-based financial systems and
innovation. I discuss the role of financial markets, banks, private equity and venture
capital firms in shaping firms innovative activities. I lay out the theoretical and empir-
ical work on the relation between financing sources and innovative investments.
In the second chapter, I investigate the role of stock market development in promot-
ing innovation. I exploit the London Big Bang, a large shock to stock market regulation
that occurred in the United Kingdom in 1986, to show that improved stock market con-
ditions foster innovation. I find that more external finance dependent firms increase
their innovation output following the London Big Bang. I identify a possible mechanism
through which stock market development promotes innovation: more external finance
dependent firms rely more on equity financing and less on long term loans after the
deregulation.
In the third chapter, we analyze how the composition of the M&A deal flow varies
over time. The question is relevant because different acquirer types affect targets differ-
ently. We link financial sponsors and strategic buyers activity in the euro area between
2000 and 2015 to the conditions in the debt and stock markets. We find that deal
flows for different types of buyers are not synchronous. In particular, we find that the
relative contribution of financial sponsors grows with credit tightness, drops when the
difference between their credit risk premium and that of strategic buyers widens, and
drops when stock market valuations rise. While the credit risk premium affects the
propensity to embark on a transaction for different buyer types, credit availability and
stock market valuations affect strategic buyers’ deal size.
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Chapter 1
Innovation and Finance: A Survey
Ostinelli, D., Innovation and Finance: A Survey, Working Paper, 2016.
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2 CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION AND FINANCE: A SURVEY
I Introduction
The present survey reviews the academic research on finance and innovation. It is mo-
tivated by three main reasons. First, the role of innovation in supporting economic
growth is very important and has been understood by economists at least since the
1950s. While Schumpeter (1934) already focused on the role of innovation as a pivotal
stimulus to economic growth, Solow (1957) decomposed output into capital and labour
inputs and stresses the importance of technical change for economic growth. Second,
the literature debating the impact of finance on growth evolved significantly since the
seventies. Goldsmith (1969) analyzes 35 countries between 1860 and 1963 and finds
a connection between economic and financial development, but he acknowledges that
it is not possible to establish the direction of the causal mechanism. More recent re-
search has gone a step further: King and Levine (1993) find that pre-determined level
of financial development predicts long-run economic growth, and in their widely cited
paper Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financial development helps disproportion-
ately firms that are typically dependent on external finance for their growth. The third
motivation of this survey is that the literature on finance and innovation, both on the
theory and especially on the empirical side, has grown dramatically in the last few years,
constituting a valuable microeconomic complement to the better established macroe-
conomic analysis of the relation between finance and economic growth. The range of
novel papers is very wide: there are papers that examine the effect of stock-markets and
banks on innovation, of stock-market deregulation, of interstate and intrastate banking
deregulation, of IPOs and LBOs, of takeovers regulation and bankruptcy codes, of sell-
side research analysts, of venture capitalists and institutional investors, and of credit
squeezes. This survey seeks to include these recent findings, to extend previous surveys
and to identify some potential topics for future research.
Following Rajan and Zingales (2001), I divide financial systems in two categories: the
arm’s-length (or market-based) system and the relationship-based (or bank dominated)
system. These two systems differ over several dimensions: the importance of the insti-
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tutional relationships between the financier and the firm, the degree of reliance on legal
enforcement, and the importance of transparency.1 While some papers discussed in this
survey perform a comparative analysis between the two systems, the survey’s purpose
is not to determine which system is best suited to finance innovation. Instead, this
survey examines recent papers showing how the characteristics of these two systems, or
a modification of these characteristics, affects the financing of innovation.
I begin this survey by examining how arm’s length system’s peculiarities affect cor-
porate innovation and the theory underlying these empirical studies. While in certain
circumstances agency costs related to financial markets may deter innovation, there is
a stronger evidence showing the positive effect of bond and especially stock-markets in
nurturing firms’ innovation by relaxing firms’ financing constraints, generating useful
information for investors, and monitoring managers. Still, firms changing their organi-
zational status from private to public may suffer in terms of innovation quality, with
skilled inventors leaving the firm after the IPO and remaining inventors experiencing
a decline in productivity. In addition, increasing stock liquidity may deter innovation,
because of increased exposure to hostile takeovers and higher presence of non-dedicated
institutional investors.
As an ideal bridge between arm’s-length and relationship-based financial systems, I
then review the literature directly comparing these two systems. From a theoretical
perspective, arm’s-length financing generates more public information, which eventually
leads to more novel innovation. On the contrary, relationship-based financing is better
suited to fund less innovative projects or incremental innovations. Empirical evidence
shows indeed that firms with a greater proportion of equity financing and public debt
outstanding in their capital structure innovate more, and better.
Continuing with this line of inquiring, I focus the rest of this survey on papers link-
ing relationship-based systems and innovation, which include banks, venture capitalists
(VCs) and private equity firms (leveraged buyouts, or LBOs). First, this survey anal-
yses the literature on banking and innovation, which is mostly devoted to assessing
1See Rajan and Zingales (2001) for a more comprehensive discussion.
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the impact of a supply shock of banking capital on innovation. In general, an increase
(decrease) of credit supply spurs (hurts) innovation, but increasing competition in the
banking market may also damage banking relationships and eventually may deter in-
novation.
Second, I move to the VCs and innovation literature, which tries to understand how
these financial intermediaries affect the innovation output of the companies in which
they invest. A part from one notable exception, empirical evidence demonstrates the
positive role exerted by VCs not only in selecting firms with high innovation potential,
but also in stimulating firms’ innovation by providing advice and monitoring. Finally, I
analyze the literature on LBOs and innovation. Recent empirical findings demonstrate
the positive effect of LBOs in relaxing financial constraints and find no evidence that
they sacrifice innovative investments.
Several other surveys cover topics related to mine, but with different perspectives.2
O’Sullivan (2004) covers the literature on finance and innovation, reviewing Schum-
peter’s work and analyzing the scarce attention that finance has been accorded as a
stimulus for innovation. A more comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical re-
search on the connections between the operation of the financial system and economic
growth is Levine (2005). Although in his theoretical part the author includes many pa-
pers relating the financial system and innovative projects, the empirical part is mostly
devoted to studies linking financial system and broad economic growth. In addition,
Hall and Lerner (2010) study the financing of innovative firms from a theoretical and
empirical point of view. In their empirical section they focus mainly on papers using
R&D expenditure as a proxy for investment in innovative activities, while more recent
papers predominantly use patent counts and patent citations as measures of innova-
tion. Da Rin et al. (2011) in their detailed review on venture capital academic research,
include a section with theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between
venture capital financing and innovation. Azoulay and Lerner (2012) review the liter-
2It shall be noted that this survey is focused on technological innovation, which includes new products and processes
as well as significant changes in products and processes. Therefore, organizational innovation, which is the adoption of
new management techniques and their consequences for firm performance, lies beyond the scope of this work (see Bloom
and Van Reenen (2010) for a detailed review).
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ature on technological innovation and organization. The authors examine not only the
financing of innovation, focusing mainly on the role played by venture capital, but they
also analyse the link between internal organization and innovation. Focusing on one of
the most widely accepted innovation measure, Lerner and Seru (2015) provide a very
detailed review on the empirical use of patents as a proxy of innovation activity. In
particular, their paper highlights the patent application process, the relevance of patent
data to finance researchers, the major resources through which they can be accessed
but also the main issues that can make its analysis problematic.
Perhaps the work most closely related to mine is Kerr and Nanda (2014), where the
authors discuss the recent findings in financing innovation. Relative to their paper,
I follow Rajan and Zingales (2001) and I group theory and empirical findings under
the two polar forms of financing, namely relationship-based systems and arm’s length
system.3 Beside using this structure, I compare these two systems from a theoretical
and empirical perspective. Second, I provide new evidence mitigating the concern that
agency costs associated with being a publicly-traded firm can deter innovation, as for
example in the context of sell-side research analysts coverage and innovation. Third,
I complete and extend the literature on banking and innovation. Finally, I extend the
fast growing empirical literature in VCs and LBOs and I discuss the theoretical models
underlying these studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses how arm’s
length financing affects corporate innovation, both from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. Section 3 covers theoretical and empirical research in relationship-based
financial systems. Section 4 discusses some areas for future research as well as future
challenges for regulators and policy makers.
3Rajan and Zingales (2003) provide further insights on these two forms of financing. In particular, arm’s lenght
financing is prevalent in the US but has becoming increasingly more important in Europe since the 1980s.
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II Arm’s lenght financial systems and innovation
Financial markets can affect firms’ innovation by alleviating financing constraints (and
therefore financing positive NPV projects that otherwise would not be financed), by
generating information, by providing incentives and feedback to managers and by mon-
itoring them. While, in principle, these functions shall be positive for innovation, re-
searchers have also found some negative externalities that potentially deter innovation.
More specifically, the literature on arm’s length financing has compared the different
firms’ financing opportunities offered by financial markets, their advantages and disad-
vantages, and analysed how financial markets’ characteristics and the functions they
perform may affect firms’ innovative behaviour. Although this section is mostly devoted
to the relationship between stock-markets and innovation, I also analyse the (relatively
smaller) bond-markets and innovation literature when I survey some papers directly
comparing arm’s length and relationship-based financial systems.
While financial systems link together entrepreneurs and savers, different costs can
make a specific contract preferable for this purpose. These costs consist in acquiring
information, enforcing contracts, and making transactions. Before making investment
decisions, there are large costs associated with evaluating firms, managers, and market
conditions. Financial intermediaries may reduce the cost of acquiring such informa-
tion and greater information can improve investment decisions, thereby accelerating
economic growth. This has been modelled first by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989).
In a framework with capital constrained entrepreneurs, the authors show that finan-
cial intermediaries collect and analyze information and fund more promising firms.
Further theoretical work analyses the relationship between financial markets and inno-
vation with that same information production perspective. An interpretation by Levine
(2005) of the work by Acemoglu et al. (2003) is that financial development will reduce
financing (credit) constraints and therefore affect innovative activities (which in their
model are opposed to the so-called ”investment-based strategies”).
Starting with Hall (1993), researchers have extensively studied the relation between
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innovation and financial markets characteristics from an empirical perspective. Among
her first papers, Hall (1993) documents the contribution of R&D and investments to
stock-market’s valuation. In particular, she finds that the stock-market valuation of
R&D intangible assets from the mid seventies to the mid eighties was higher than the
valuation from mid eighties to early nineties. Even though the paper does not disentan-
gle among the several possible explanations leading to a fall in the R&D valuation, it
nonetheless provides an indication of financial markets’ feedbacks, which could be used
by managers in making investment decisions. Although not only related to innovation,
an important contribution in understanding whether a firm’s stock price affects its in-
vestment, or more generally the relation between markets and investments, is Bakke
and Whited (2010).4 With a novel empirical approach they address the following two
questions: do market signals provide new knowledge to managers (or should managers
ignore these signals)? And are managers reluctant to issue equity to exploit over val-
uation of their companies’ shares? While they find limited evidence that firms invest
after issuing overpriced equity, they find that the portion of the variation in Tobin’s
q that is relevant for investment rises with the amount of private investor information
that is included in the stock price.
A recent paper by Levine et al. (2015) empirically assesses the enforcement of insider
trading laws on innovation: such enforcement reduces the ability of corporate insiders to
trade on private information and could encourage outsiders to invest more in research-
ing firms. On the one hand, the resulting additional information produced may improve
firms’ valuation, and markets that fully value innovation should provide the right in-
centive to firms to invest more in new products. On the other hand, to the extent that
the enforcement of insider trading laws increases stock liquidity, a countervailing effect
may potentially harm the information production function and eventually innovation:
as highlighted by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), when stock markets quickly reveal in-
formation, they reduce the incentive to produce information for private investors. First,
4Bakke and Whited (2010) take the sum of capital expenditures and research and development (R&D) as measure of
investment.
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Levine et al. (2015) use a difference-in-differences approach and find that the enforce-
ment of insider trading laws in 97 countries led to a significant increase in innovation,
measured with five different proxies reflecting intensity, scope, impact, generality and
originality of patents. Furthermore, they narrow their identification strategy to address
several interpretation challenges and find that innovation increases more in industries
that are more innovative, opaque, equity dependent and that have more liquid shares.
This is consistent with the view that insider trading laws make investors more keen to
invest their money in R&D intensive firms and the subsequent improvement in company
valuation creates the right incentive for these firms to invest in innovation.
Focusing on the monitoring function, Atanassov (2013) analyses hostile takeovers,
which represent one of the strongest corporate governance mechanisms. By exploiting
the enactment of Business Combination anti-takeover laws in the US as an exogenous
decrease in the threat of hostile takeovers, Atanassov (2013) finds that firms incor-
porated in states that pass anti-takeover laws innovate less after the law is passed.
Moreover, he finds that the reduction in innovation generated by anti-takeover laws
is mitigated, although not perfectly, by alternative monitoring mechanism such as the
presence of a large shareholder or an activist pension fund, for companies with financial
leverage and for firms belonging to industry with high product market competition.
These results are consistent with Aghion et al. (2013) on the role of institutional in-
vestors on innovation. In particular, the authors ask the following question: did the rise
in institutional ownership increased short-termism? To put it differently, did the pres-
sure for quarterly results discouraged managers from undertaking innovative projects?
With a panel dataset of over 800 major US firms over the 1990s they show that there
is a robust positive relation between innovation and institutional ownership structure.
By exploiting an exogenous increase in institutional ownership that follows the addition
of a stock to the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500, they show that this has a positive
effect on innovation, suggesting that the effect of institutions on innovation is positive
and causal.
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Focusing on intrinsic differences at industry level, further empirical research tries
to determine how financial markets development and their characteristics may affect
firms’ innovation. Hsu et al. (2014) compare innovation across countries and find that
more external finance dependent industries exhibit a disproportionally higher innova-
tion level in countries with better developed equity markets, while the development of
credit markets discourages innovation in more external finance dependent industries.
An even more detailed analysis of credit market characteristics has been performed
by Acharya and Subramanian (2009), who analyze the impact of bankruptcy codes on
innovation. The underlying idea is that there is a conflict of interest between equity
holders and creditors at the time of distress. Performing a cross-countries comparison,
the authors find that in countries with strong creditor rights technologically innovative
industries grow more slowly. The challenge when assessing empirically the effect of fi-
nancial development on innovation is that innovation may be endogenous with company
and financial market conditions, including stock-market characteristics. To overcome
this obstacle, Ostinelli (2016a) uses a quasi natural experiment setting to examine the
reaction of firms to a significant event of financial markets deregulation and finds that
an improvement in stock-market development promotes firm level innovation, both in
terms of patent counts and in terms of patent citations. Specifically, the paper ex-
ploits the London Big Bang, a large and exogenous shock to stock market regulation
that occurred in the United Kingdom in 1986. The London Big Bang, following the
removal of membership restrictions to the London Stock Exchange and the elimination
of fixed trade commissions, substantially increased the daily turnover on the exchange
and facilitated firms’ raising of capital. First, the paper shows that firms belonging
to high external finance dependent industries increase innovation after the Big Bang.
Additionally, as a potential mechanism through which stock-market development fos-
ters innovation, Ostinelli (2016a) finds that more external finance dependent firms rely
more on equity financing and less on long term loans after the deregulation. Acharya
and Xu (2015) similarly find that listed firms belonging to high external finance depen-
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dent industries spend more on R&D and generate a better patent portfolio than their
private counterparts, while public firms in internal finance dependent industries do not
innovate neither more nor better than their private counter parts. An early important
contribution in this field is Brown et al. (2009), which focuses on the determinants of
R&D financing. In particular, they analyse the period from 1994 to 2004 in the US,
which saw a dramatic boom, then a subsequent decline, in R&D spending. Virtually
all of the 1990s U.S. R&D boom was concentrated in seven high-tech industries and
was accounted for by young firms (publicly traded for fewer than 15 years) in these
industries. Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) argue that the R&D boom and the
subsequent drop was driven by a large and positive shift in the supply of equity, both
internal (cash flow) and external.
In contrast to Levine et al. (2015) who show that the effect on innovation of increased
stock liquidity generated by the enforcement of insider trading laws is offset by a higher
amount available information, Fang et al. (2014) come to different results. Exploiting
decimalization as a large and exogenous shock to stock liquidity, Fang et al. (2014) find
that firms experiencing the largest increase in liquidity following the decimalization pro-
duced 3.5 fewer patents in the three years period immediately after the decimalization
relative to the three years period immediately before the decimalization. As channels
through which liquidity affects innovation, Fang et al. (2014) indicate increased takeover
exposure and the presence of non-dedicated institutional investors.5
Focusing on the incentives that financial markets generate when selecting between
different investment projects, Holmstrom (1989) develops a principal agent model to
explain how agency costs affect the choice of projects. Building on explicit models that
feature myopic behaviour, Holmstrom (1989) argues that innovation, which tends to pay
off in the distant rather than the near future, will not be undertaken sufficiently often
by listed firms. The problem tends to be even more severe in large firms, because they
have more flexibility and independence. Ferreira et al. (2014) compare conventional
projects with innovative projects for private and public firms and show that it is opti-
5Dedicated investors have concentrated portfolio holdings and low portfolio turnover (see Bushee (1998)).
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mal to remain public when exploiting conventional projects and optimal to go private
when exploring innovative projects. In particular, the opacity of private firms increases
insiders’ tolerance for failures and makes them more inclined to invest in innovative
projects. Building on this, Bernstein (2015) focuses on the potential disadvantages of
being listed in public equity markets, for instance managerial agency problems that
may deter innovation activity. Using NASDAQ fluctuations as an instrument for IPO
completion, Bernstein (2015) finds that going public significantly reduces firms’ inno-
vation quality following the departure of skilled inventors and a decline in the quality
of innovation produced by inventors who remained at the firm.
A further interesting debate related to information production considers the effect of
analysts coverage on innovation. Sell-side research analysts provide their clients with in-
vestment advice, which derives from their own valuations of the firms they cover. When
sell-side research analysts modify their firm valuations, often following new earnings es-
timates, they may provide updated investment recommendations, which in turn moves
stock prices. For this reason, firm managers pay particular attention to recommen-
dations; consequently, recommendations could impose short-term pressure, exacerbate
myopic behaviour, affect investment decisions and eventually deter innovation. Still,
sell-side research analysts may contribute to reducing information asymmetry by col-
lecting information and helping current and potential investors understand investments
in innovation. Thus, this effect may counterbalance the induced myopic behaviour, such
that the management of the firm would not refrain from investing in value-enhancing
innovation projects. He and Tian (2013) test these alternative hypotheses and find
that an increase in the number of sell-side research analyst reduces firm’s innovation
output, consistent with the hypothesis that analysts exert pressure on managers who
sacrifice innovation projects to meet short term earning targets. This striking result has
been further examined by Clarke et al. (2015), who conclude that the negative relation
between analyst coverage and innovation outputs is driven by what the authors call
poor quality innovators. In particular, Clarke et al. (2015) stratify the sample based on
12 CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION AND FINANCE: A SURVEY
the firm’s past innovation quality, measured by patent citations. Interestingly, Clarke
et al. (2015) find that sell-side research analysts discourage innovation in firms with
multiple patents yet few citations, while they encourage innovation in the most produc-
tive firms. Still, if an analyst’s decision to follow a firm is driven by the firm’s future
innovation output or if there is unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both
analyst coverage and innovation, findings may be biased. Therefore, Clarke et al. (2015)
exploit two plausible quasi-natural experiments, namely brokerage closures and broker-
age mergers. In each of this two cases, an observed firm loses one analyst for reasons
unrelated to the characteristics of the firms covered by their sell-side research analysts.
Brokerage closures are motivated by business strategy considerations of the brokerage
houses themselves, while in the case of brokerage mergers, redundant analysts often
leave the merged entity. Thus, if a stock is covered by two merging brokerage houses
before the merger and an analyst leaves the merged entity, analyst coverage decreases.
In addition, they also use an instrumental variable introduced in Yu (2008) and they
confirm their previous findings. Clarke et al. (2015) paper is particularly important
because it lessens the concern that agency costs related to public stock-markets deter
innovation. On the contrary, the authors show that sell-side research analysts recognize
past innovative success and contribute reducing less valuable innovation.
Summing up, empirical research has confirmed theoretical works showing the positive
role of financial markets in stimulating innovation. In particular, there is growing
evidence mitigating the concern that agency costs associated with being a publicly-
traded firm can deter innovation, as for example Levine et al. (2015) in the context of
insider trading and innovation, Ostinelli (2016a) in the context of financial development
and innovation, and Clarke et al. (2015), which revisits the conflict between analysts
coverage and innovation. While stock liquidity or going public may lead to inventors’
mobility and inventors’ productivity changes, financial markets generally help firms in
financing their projects, including innovative investments.
I conclude this section by surveying the theoretical and empirical works comparing
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arm’s length systems and relationship-based systems. Rajan and Zingales (2001) and
Rajan and Zingales (2003) analyze these two systems from a historical and geographic
perspective, discuss their costs and benefits and assess their performance contingent
upon different degrees of market and firm size, legal enforcement, and transparency.
With regard to innovation, Rajan and Zingales (2001) suggest that arm’s length fi-
nancing allows investors to evaluate independently the portfolio of innovative projects
of the firm and therefore it is better suited to finance more revolutionary innovation.
In normal times instead, when change is incremental, relationship-based financing is
better suited to finance (relatively less novel) innovation.
Building on this, and keeping in mind the theoretical framework of Holmstrom
(1989), Atanassov (2014) uses a panel of public firms to test whether their innovative
activity is related to the source of their external financing. Atanassov (2014) finds first
that firms with a greater proportion of arm’s length financing such as public debt and
equity have a larger number of patents and these patents are more significant in terms
of influencing subsequent patents. Moreover, these firms have more volatile patents
and higher score of originality and generality, suggesting that firms with public debt
financing and a greater proportion of equity financing create more innovations in new
technological fields. On the debt side this result is somewhat surprising and, combined
with Acharya and Subramanian (2009), adds further evidence that public debt can play
a positive role in promoting firm innovation.
Then, Atanassov (2014) focuses on bank financing, and finds that firms borrowing
from multiple banks have more novel innovations. The intuition, provided by Rajan and
Zingales (2003), is the following: if firms borrow from multiple banks, there is a greater
probability that at least one bank will fund the project. Furthermore, multiple banks
lending is more of an arm’s length relationship than borrowing from a single bank. In
addition, Atanassov (2014) finds that firms with credit lines are more innovative, while
firms with term loans are less innovative than otherwise similar firms. Finally, firms
with stricter covenants receive fewer citations per patent; the intuition is that loans
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that are more covenant-light allow more flexibility.
III Relationship-based financial systems and innovation
III.I Banking and innovation
In recent years a growing body of literature has analysed the relationship between
the banking system and innovation. The topic is particularly interesting because it is
commonly believed that debt, and in particular bank debt, is not well suited to finance
innovative projects. In this section I briefly review the theoretical literature in this field
before turning to the empirical literature, which mainly exploits positive and negative
shocks to credit supply to assess the importance of bank lending in financing innovative
projects.
Banks, and more in general financial institutions, generally emerge in response to
capital market imperfections and provide important functions which potentially miti-
gate frictions related to investments in innovation. These functions include generating
information, monitoring, and risk pooling. King and Levine (1993) present a model
in which financial intermediaries select entrepreneurs and provide external finance in
their initiation of innovative activity, increasing the probability of successful innova-
tion. De la Fuente and Mar´ın (1996) develop a framework for analysing the interaction
between output growth and financial development (in a context in which both are
endogenous). They show that financial intermediaries contribute to growth by collect-
ing information (in terms of monitoring) which, by improving their ability to provide
risk-pooling services, facilitates the flow of resources to risky innovative activities. In
particular, monitoring lessens the moral hazard problem arising from the combination
of risk aversion (on the part of investors) and private information in research (on the
part of entrepreneurs). Therefore, more efficient financial systems should generate more
innovation.
Bencivenga and Smith (2001) construct a model in which banks channel savings to
investment, affecting resource allocations in ways that have implications for real growth
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rates, causing intermediation to be growth promoting. In particular, the presence of
intermediaries permits an economy to reduce the fraction of its savings held in the form
of unproductive liquid assets, and to prevent misallocations of invested capital due to
liquidity needs.
Building on the theoretical intuition of King and Levine (1993), one of the first
empirical papers investigating the complex link between the development of the banking
sector and innovation at the firm level is Benfratello et al. (2008). By matching banking
development data in Italy (they rely on branch density by province, calculated as the
number of branches divided by population) and survey data on innovation activities
of Italian manufacturing firms, they conclude that banking development affects the
probability of process innovation, in particular for firms in high-tech sectors, in sectors
more dependent on external finance, and for firms that are small, while the evidence for
product innovation is much weaker and not robust.6 Ayyagari et al. (2007) analyze firm
innovation activity in emerging markets and find that financing from foreign banks is
associated with higher levels of innovation compared to financing from domestic banks.
While these papers have been able to demonstrate a relationship between innovation
and banking development, they have little to say about causality: is it the flourishing
banking system that causes innovation or is it the presence of more innovative firms that
attract bank lending? In order to address this issue, several papers exploit exogenous
regulatory policies affecting the US banking system, namely interstate and intrastate
banking deregulation. On the one hand, following the interstate banking deregulation
acts passed during the 1980s and 1990s, out-of-state bank holding companies were
allowed to acquire banks chartered in the deregulating states. This led to an increase
in the credit supply, facilitated banks’ geographic diversification of credit risk, and
was associated with better screening and monitoring technologies. On the other hand,
with intrastate banking deregulation, passed in different states from the early 1970s to
the mid-1990s, banks were allowed to expand within state borders, which intensified
6A product innovation is the introduction of a new good or service, while process innovation refers to the introduction
of new methods, equipment or skills. More formally, product innovation is formalized as an upward shift in the demand
curve, while process innovation lowers the marginal cost of production Mantovani (2006).
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banking competition and increased the size of banks.
Amore et al. (2013) exploit interstate deregulation and find that increasing bank
competition had significant beneficial effects on the quantity and quality of innovation
activities. Cornaggia et al. (2015) find (apparently) opposite results: increasing banking
competition cause states’ innovation outputs to decline. Still, their further analyses
provide a different picture: while public corporations with headquarters in a deregulated
state reduce their patenting output, both in terms of patent counts and in terms of
patent citations, private firms experience increases in innovation output following the
deregulatory events. Their hypothesis is that improved competition in banking provides
good access to finance to small, privately-held, innovative firms that are likely targets
and this expansion of credit will reduce the relative attractiveness of being acquired.
In order to address the problem that lending relationships and innovation may not
be random (i.e. they are likely to be endogenous to firm characteristics that may be
correlated with innovation activity), Hombert and Matray (2012) use intrastate banking
deregulation, with the aim of isolating the effect of a shock to lending relationships with
no change in banks’ ability to diversify geographically, since diversification benefits are
lower for within-state expansion compared to across states diversification.
After proxying for relationship dependence at the firm level by its degree of opacity,
they find that innovation decreases following intrastate deregulation. In particular, the
negative effect of deregulation is stronger in more relationship-dependent industries,
while the effect is never significant in industries less reliant on relationships. They
motivate their results as evidence of an increase in competition damaging lending rela-
tionships and increasing credit constraints for lending relationship-dependent firms.
Both interstate and intrastate banking deregulation in the US have been exploited
also by Chava et al. (2013). According to the previous literature (see for example Berger
et al. (2014) banks play an important role in financing young, private firms. The authors
therefore focus on firms with these characteristics and by disentangling the effects of
these two deregulatory acts they find that while intrastate deregulation decreases the
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level and risk of innovation by young, private firms, interstate deregulation increased
both.
Finally, at least two more papers use a different setting than deregulation to study
innovation and bank financing. First, Smith (2011) uses survey data to investigate
the role of debt and bank loans in the early financing of new high-tech firms. She
finds that information asymmetry combined with technical risk influences the ability to
secure bank financing. In particular, there is evidence that as information asymmetry is
lessened over successive periods, banks are more likely to lend to high-tech firms. As the
riskiness of high-tech firms decreases, they are increasingly likely to receive bank loans
over time. Nanda and Nicholas (2014) further examine the link between the health of
the financial sector and innovation. Interestingly, while previous papers in this field
exploit liberalizations as positive shocks to the banking credit supply, they exploit the
impact of a credit squeeze, using the Great Depression as an exogenous event at the
firm level. With micro-data on corporate R&D, patent and patent citation records from
the U.S. patent office and county-level data on banking in the United States compiled
by the FDIC, they exploit cross-county variation in the severity of bank distress to
understand how this affected corporate innovation.7 First, they find that private firms
experienced declines in R&D output and patenting activity relative to publicly traded
corporations. Second, when they focus only on publicly traded firms, they find that the
overall effect on patenting is smaller and concentrated among firms heavily dependent
on external finance. Their findings show a negative relationship between bank distress
during the Great Depression and the level and quality of innovation by the firms that
were most affected.
Overall, recent empirical literature on banking and innovation has shown that bank
debt is an important source for the financing of innovative projects, especially for young
and small firms which do not have access to equity market. These results are in line
with Rajan and Zingales (2003), which argue that relationship-based systems perform
7The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a United States government corporation providing deposit
insurance to depositors.
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better with small firms. Moreover, the literature has shown that negative shocks to
the credit supply impede innovation, while positive shocks to the credit supply affect
innovation by relaxing financial constraints and altering lending relationships.
III.II Venture Capital and Private Equity and innovation
Many recent papers study the relationship between venture capital firms (VCs) and
innovation and private equity (leveraged buyouts, or LBOs) and innovation. I start
this section by reviewing some of the main theoretical contributions in the VC field,
with the aim to understand how typical VC features may foster innovation in venture-
backed companies. Then, I review the empirical work on VCs and innovation and
finally I review the (relatively smaller) empirical literature analysing the effect of LBOs
on innovation.
Many theory papers have focused on the mechanisms that reduce agency conflicts
between entrepreneurs and investors, all of them ascribable to the typical functions
that VC investors perform within the VC cycle.8 All these functions and mechanisms,
which include screening, monitoring, providing advice and staging investment, act, at
least indirectly, as potential innovation stimuli. Focusing on the screening function,
Chan (1983) shows how intermediaries, as informed agents, increase investors’ utility
by inducing the entrepreneur to offer high return projects in a VC market where all
investors have positive information costs.9 A broader analysis of the relationships oc-
curring among the Venture Capitalist, investors (limited partners) and companies is
performed by Sahlman (1990). A key feature of VC investing is that usually they
do not invest all the money in a given company at the same time, but they do so
in different stages, with the implicit right to abandon the project. This generates
the appropriate incentives for the entrepreneur, because the misuse of funds could be
very costly: first, increased capital requirements invariably dilute management’s equity
share at an increasingly punitive rate; second, staged investment process enables VCs
8The VC cycle (see Gompers and Lerner (2004)), consists in fund-raising, investing, and exiting successful deals.
9The screening function refers to the activity of selecting companies into which VC inject money. Additional standard
functions exerted by the VC are monitoring and adding value to firms.
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to shut down operations completely. In addition, denying capital is also a bad signal
for other investors. Beside this, Venture Capitalists can discipline managers by firing or
demoting them. Although Sahlman (1990) does not provide a model, his contribution
is important for the intuitions he provides on how VC features affect an entrepreneur’s
behaviour and his willingness to innovate. At least three papers formally model the
staging of investment: Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) model the contract between the
entrepreneur and the VC and show that the only contract for the VC that induces
optimal continuation in all circumstances is a fixed-fraction contract, in which the VC
owns the same fraction of the pay-off independent of the continuation decision, and also
finances that same fraction of any future investment. This implies that outside investors
will necessarily be involved in later financing stages. Bergemann and Hege (1998) pro-
vide a model of investment staging and show that long-term contracts distribute the
entrepreneur’s return over time in a way that maximizes the research horizon and stress
that the interaction between investment and learning process and the incentives nec-
essary to implement both processes is central to financing of R&D in general. Finally,
Cornelli and Yosha (2003) show that with stage financing VC and entrepreneurs agree
to inject capital over time and the Venture Capitalist retains the option to abandon
the venture whenever the forward looking net present value of the project is negative.
Accordingly, the threat to abandon creates incentives for the entrepreneur to maximize
value and meet goals.10
A number of empirical studies analyse the relationship between VC and innovative
activities. While many of them measure innovation with patents, some others focus
on innovative products or use total factor productivity (TFP) growth as innovation
proxies.11 One of the first papers in this field is Hellmann and Puri (2002), which
analyzes a sample of Silicon Valley-based firms. Some firms received VC financing while
10Although not directly related with innovation, Hellmann and Puri (2002) focus on how VC provide advice to the
companies in their portfolio and examines the relationship between VC’s and entrepreneurs from the perspective of
corporate control. His model suggests that under certain circumstances a wealth constrained entrepreneur may be
willing to relinquish the right to be the CEO and be replaced by a professional manager with superior management skills
and this will lead ultimately to an improvement in efficiency.
11Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs (aggregate capital
and aggregate labour) used in production (see Comin, 2006).
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others did not: the authors aim to understand whether VC involvement has an impact
on the development path of entrepreneurial companies. First, they find that innovative
firms are more likely to be venture-backed firms than imitator companies. Second, they
find that innovative venture-backed firms are faster in bringing their products to market
than non venture-backed ones. Similarly, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) confirm the VC
contribution to innovation by showing that a large percentage of VC investments is in
companies that are developing new products but are yet without any sales.
Kortum and Lerner (2000) further scrutinize the relationship between VC and in-
novation focusing on US manufacturing industries. Using patents as a measure of
innovation, they first find that VC is more powerful at stimulating innovation than
is corporate R&D. Then, in order to exclude the possibility that the positive effect
is caused by the arrival of (unobserved) technological opportunities, they show that
their results are robust to the 1979 amendment to the Prudent Man Rule, a policy
shift that stimulated venture capital fundraising.12 Overall, their findings suggest that
VC financing positively affects the patenting activity of young firms. Hirukawa and
Ueda (2011) try to better understand this relationship: is it VC that stimulates in-
novation (VC-first) or is it innovation that induces VC investments (innovation first)?
Using the Granger to test for causality between innovation and VC investment, they
find weak support for the VC-first hypothesis by employing TFP growth as innovation
measure, while they find little evidence for both the innovation-first and the VC-first
hypotheses when using patents as innovation measure.13 Similarly with Kortum and
Lerner (2000), Gonzalez-Uribe (2014) finds that patent citations increase following VC
financing, particularly for patents granted to other companies financed by the same VC
investor.
Beside answering to some important questions, Kortum and Lerner (2000) raise an
additional question which remained unanswered for a long time. In fact, until the paper
by Bernstein et al. (2015) it was not clear whether the key element that potentially
12Prior to 1979 amendment, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) limited pension funds from
investing substantial amounts of money into VC.
13The Granger causality test examines whether past realizations of a time series are useful to predict the future values
of another time series.
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makes VC-backed companies more innovative is how the Venture Capitalist selects the
firm to invest in (selection function) or the ex post monitoring and advising activity
(monitoring function). Bernstein et al. (2015) exploit the introduction of new airline
routes that reduce the travel time between VCs and their existing portfolio companies
as an exogenous variation in the VC involvement to disentangle these two effects. They
find that the introduction of a new airline route leads to a 3.1% increase in the number
of patents produced by the portfolio company and a 5.8% increase in the number of
citations, suggesting indeed that the monitoring function has a positive effect on the
innovation output of companies which received VC financing. Matray (2015) provides
further evidence on the relation between VC and innovation. After documenting local
innovation spillovers from listed firms to private firms in the same geographical area, he
studies the relationship between innovation spillovers and capital availability. First, he
finds that the stock of patents filed by listed firms generates non-local VC investments.
Then, he analyzes whether VC availability influences the magnitude of spillovers. After
instrumenting VC investments by the amount of local and state public pension funds, he
shows that exogenous variations in the amount of the available VC capital significantly
amplify local innovation spillovers.
Whereas many papers study the effect of VC on innovation, very few papers analyze
the impact of LBO’s on innovation. Two notable exceptions are Lerner et al. (2011),
and Amess et al. (2016). Lerner et al. (2011) analyze a sample of 472 firms that re-
ceived private equity backing with at least one successful patent application filed in the
period from 3 years before to 5 years after being part of a private equity transaction.
Although they do not find evidence that LBO transactions affect the level of patenting,
they find that patent citations increase in the years following the transaction. While
these findings are a very important contribution in the long-standing debate about
whether LBOs create value for the firms they acquire, the authors acknowledge that
their analysis might well suffer from endogeneity problems, i.e. they are unable to de-
termine whether LBOs cause changes in patent activity or whether private equity firms
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select among the potential targets those which already have forthcoming improvements
in patent activity.14
The empirical strategy of Amess et al. (2016) directly addresses this issue and con-
firms Lerner et al. (2011)’s findings. With a sample of UK LBO transactions and
by using the propensity score matching technique, Amess et al. (2016) compare in a
difference-in-differences setting the innovation output of LBO backed companies with a
control group of firms with similar pre-buyout characteristics, such as size, labour pro-
ductivity, exporting, skill intensity, debt, profitability and age, that were not financed
by LBO funds. First, they find that private equity-backed firms increase patenting
output, both in terms of patents counts and in terms of patent citations. Second, they
find that this effect is concentrated among firms that are likely to be more financially
constrained, such as firms belonging to industries with a high dependency on external
finance, firms that were privately owned before LBO investment and firms that have a
relatively low credit score. Among this group of firms, those with lower creditworthi-
ness have the largest effect on quality-adjusted patenting. This result may be explained
by an interesting feature of LBOs financing: because of their relationships with banks,
LBOs can get cheaper debt than target companies could obtain under their current
management.
To conclude, there is consensus around the positive role of VC financing in nurtur-
ing innovation in young and small firms. Interestingly, recent empirical evidence has
established the beneficial role of LBOs about one form of long-run investment, namely,
investments in innovative projects. In fact, as it was the case for before Bernstein et al.
(2015) in the context of VC, research had still to prove if LBOs affect the innovation
output of the companies in which they invest or they select companies with stronger
innovation potential. Reassuringly, Amess et al. (2016) fill this gap.
14Still, these findings pertain predominantly “old economy” firms, suggesting that the concern is moderate.
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IV Conclusions
Recent years have seen a profusion of papers examining the relation between finance
and innovation, which often build up on the literature on finance and economic growth.
This survey analyses some of the main functions exerted by financial markets and
their impact on innovation. Although financial markets may exacerbate agency costs
that might be detrimental to firms engaged in innovative activities, a large body of
work show how they foster innovation by relaxing financing constraints, producing
information, and monitoring. This survey also covers the literature analysing how
financial intermediaries interact with firms and affect their innovative efforts. While
there are new findings showing a positive link between bank financing and innovation,
there is large evidence on the positive role exerted by LBOs and especially VCs.
As nicely written by Zingales (2015), despite the large academic literature, Society
still disagrees on the positive role of finance in promoting economic growth. Since in-
novation is one of the major drivers of economic growth, I think it is important to
understand how finance affects innovation. While academics can contribute to improv-
ing the perception of finance in the Society, policy-makers and regulators still have
many challenges ahead since they can, along with other market participants, alter or
lobby to change financial market and financial intermediary characteristics. China, for
example, which supports state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in strategic sectors and incen-
tivizes multinationals to transfer their R&D centres in China, could foster indigenous
innovation by further implementing structural financial markets reforms and ensuring
a sound legal framework.15
Beside China, other stock exchanges in emerging markets are still in need for reforms.
Russia is a further example: in February 2013, Russia’s Main Stock Exchange stocks
began trading. Is this preventing Russian companies from listing abroad? And, more
importantly, does the effect of the privatization of the exchange propagate to the real
15see The Economist, Chinese Private firms are embracing innovation, September 2015, and Cao et al.(2016), which
exploits two China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) implemented reforms of the IPO auction bidding process
to determine the relationship between bidding dispersion and share offer pricing.
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economy? Promoting innovation in young, start-up firms is also a frequent discussion
topic. In this context, Hellman (2016) raises an important question for governments
willing to foster entrepreneurial ecosystems: shall governments focus on policies that
back entrepreneurs by helping them start companies or on policies that back investors by
making investments more attractive? His theory finds that policies that back investors
by making investments more attractive drive up valuations of start-ups, and thereby
increase funding for future entrepreneurs.
In addition, other innovation-related topics shall be carefully considered by govern-
ments, as for example the role played by Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), or ”patent
trolls”, an issue particularly severe in the US.16 I think that a better understanding of
these topics should be put on the agenda for future research.
16See Cohen, Gurun, Kominers, 2015 for a theoretical model and empirical evidence of the behaviour and impact of
NPEs in the US
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I Introduction
Does stock market development promote innovation? While innovation has been recog-
nized as being pivotal for economic growth (Solow (1957)) and the relationship between
economic growth and broad financial development has been extensively investigated,
as reported in the survey by Levine (2005), there is little empirical research directly
relating innovation and financial markets development. Whereas theoretical predictions
about the role of stock market development on innovation are mixed, the difficulty when
studying empirically the effect of financial development on innovation is that innova-
tion may be endogenous with company and financial market conditions, including stock
market characteristics.
To overcome this obstacle, I employ a quasi-experimental design that allows me to
examine the reaction of firms to a significant act of financial markets deregulation. In
particular, my identification strategy consists in exploiting the London Big Bang, a
package of reforms swept through the London Stock Exchange on October 1986, as a
quasi-natural experiment for a plausibly exogenous shock to stock market development.
The London Big Bang has been the most rapid and complete regulatory reform of any
market: the exclusion of all foreigners from Stock Exchange membership was termi-
nated, fixed trade commissions were abolished and trading moved off the floor.1As a
consequence of the Big Bang, foreign banks acquired UK brokers and jobbers, trading
volume increased, transaction costs decreased and eventually the City of London con-
solidated its position as one of the major players in the international financial markets.
Whereas the Big Bang affected all the spectrum of firms listed in London, I expect
that the effect of an improvement of stock market development on corporate decisions
with regard to innovative projects varies along firm’s dependence on external finance,
as suggested by the financial development literature. For example, Rajan and Zingales
(1998) show that stock market development fosters economic growth in more external
finance dependent sectors. In fact, the fundamental role of financial markets in lessening
1Brokers buy and sell shares on behalf of their clients while jobbers (or dealers), as the specialists in the US, act as
the market maker on a given security.
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the moral hazard and adverse selection problems should reduce the cost of external
finance vis a` vis the cost of internal capital. With this in mind, while firms with
strong balance sheet may finance innovative projects internally, for more financially
constrained firms it becomes even more critical to finance investment projects raising
money from outsiders. As a consequence, firms more dependent on external finance
should be better off with more developed financial markets and should benefit the most
from an improvement in its development.
Using hand-collected data, I first show in a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting
that British listed firms belonging to industries that are more external finance dependent
innovate more after the Big Bang than low external finance dependent firms. Then,
with the aim to address the concern that my results are driven only by unobserved
technological trends at industry level, I compare the innovation output of listed UK
firms with a group of listed Dutch and Italian firms unaffected by the shock. Both
the Netherlands and Italy seem an appropriate control group for the following reasons:
first, the Netherlands export extensively to the United Kingdom. Therefore, British
and Dutch firms are exposed to similar macroeconomic conditions, yet their financing
opportunities differ. Second, Italy reformed its Stock Exchange only in the Nineties:
as a consequence, Italian firms were not in a position to benefit from well developed
stock market at the time that the London Big Bang happened. Reassuringly, they
do not exhibit the same post-Big Bang pattern. Finally, I show that there is no pre-
deregulation trend.
Second, I further support my results by borrowing the Hsu et al. (2014) mapping
strategy and analyzing innovation at industry level. Consistent with my methodology,
I show that patenting activity of more external finance dependent industries increased
following the deregulation. I conduct a number of robustness checks to examine whether
my results are robust to alternative proxies for external finance dependence, and are
particularly significant for manufacturing industries, since patents are more important
to manufacturing industries than to other industries. As for the firm level analysis, I
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show that there is no trend before the London Big Bang.
Finally, I explore the possible mechanisms through which improved stock market con-
ditions promote innovation. In particular, I use the DiD approach to inquire if changes
in the potential mechanism are more significant for high external finance dependent
firms than for low external finance dependent firms. First, I find that the interaction
term for equity financing is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that both
groups increase their reliance on equity financing following the Big Bang. Second, I find
that firms belonging to more external finance dependent industries decrease their long
term loans issue. Therefore, a different source of financing resulting in less recourse to
debt could ease the funding of innovative projects for firms belonging to more external
finance dependent industries.
My research question relates to a large body of theoretical works linking financial
markets and economic growth. While some papers focus on the myopic corporate be-
haviour which potentially harms good investment opportunities, other research predicts
a positive effect of financial market development on innovation.2 First, financial mar-
kets are essential in fostering specialization, as captured in the model of Greenwood and
Smith (1997). Since more specialization requires more transactions and transactions
are costly, financial arrangements that lower transaction costs will facilitate greater
specialization. A second and perhaps even more important function of financial mar-
kets is to produce information about possible investments and allocate capital. Since
acquiring information is costly, investors may not have the ability to gather informa-
tion before making investment decisions. Financial intermediaries may therefore reduce
the cost of acquiring information ex ante, with a subsequent improvement in capital
allocation. The model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989) shows that, assuming that
many entrepreneurs need capital and that capital is scarce, financial intermediaries that
produce better information on firms will thereby fund more promising firms and induce
a more efficient capital allocation.
2See Holmstrom (1989) and Stein (1989) for the managerial myopic behaviour. Managers facing a rational stock
market may abandon good investments at the expense of longer terms benefits.
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My findings contribute to two streams of literature. First, my paper contributes to
the literature that examines the outcomes of financial markets regulation, with focus on
the United Kingdom. Chambers and Dimson (2009) analyze historical underpricing on
the London Stock Exchange and find that in the post Big Bang period underpricing has
continued to rise, and while it has been driven by substantial underpricing of smaller
firms, IPOs on the main market have also displayed higher underpricing. Gemmill
(1996) analyzes the effect of three different prices publication regimes of block trades
after the Big Bang and finds that reducing transparency by delaying the publication
has little impact on spreads, speed of adjustment, smoothing, or ultimate price level.
Braggion and Ongena (2015) investigate firm-bank relationships and corporate financ-
ing during a 90-year period from 1896 to 1986 in Britain and find that following the
banking sector deregulation in 1970 firms shifted from bilateral to multilateral relation-
ship banking. Moreover, they provide evidence that after the deregulation firms that
added banks increased their reliance on bank debt and leverage. I continue this line
of inquiry by showing that the Big Bang, which entailed major restructuring of most
aspects of London’s securities trading, had an impact beyond the financial industry and
affected corporate innovation output.
Second, I contribute to the literature on finance and innovation.3 This literature
focuses on relations between innovation and firm characteristics and on relations be-
tween innovation and financial market characteristics. With regards to innovation and
firms characteristics, Seru (2014) attests the importance of firm boundaries on innova-
tion, while Fang et al. (2014) find that stock liquidity deters innovation. Aghion et al.
(2013) show that firms with higher institutional ownership innovate more as higher in-
stitutional ownership lowers manager career concerns that arise with riskier innovation.
Bernstein (2015) finds that going public significantly reduces firms’ innovation quality
and that public firms partially offset their lower internal innovation output with re-
spect to private firms with externally purchased innovation by M&A. By contrast there
3For a comprehensive review of the recent literature on the financing of innovation see Kerr and Nanda (2014) and
Ostinelli (2016b).
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are few empirical studies analyzing the link between innovation and financial market
characteristics. Benfratello et al. (2008) find that local banking development increases
the process innovation of Italian manufacturing firms, while Nanda and Nicholas (2014)
show that bank distress during the great depression diminished both the quantity and
the quality of firm patenting. Cornaggia et al. (2015) provide evidence that increasing
banking competition fosters innovation among corporations that are heavily dependent
on external finance. My research is also closely related with a recent study focusing on
the relationship between innovation and financial markets development. Building on
the seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Hsu et al. (2014) find that more ex-
ternal finance dependent industries exhibit a disproportionally higher innovation level
in countries with better developed equity markets, while the development of credit
markets appears to discourage innovation in industries with these characteristics. My
contribution is to study the innovation output with firm level data and to exploit a
different identification strategy allowing me to investigate a potential mechanism for
how an improvement in stock market development fosters innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes in more detail the
changes that took place at the London Stock Exchange in 1986. Section III discuss
my data collection and provides summary statistics. Section IV describes my empirical
strategy and reports my results. Section V concludes.
II The 1986 London Big Bang
The London Big Bank, which occured on October 27 1986, represented a dramatic
change for the London Stock Exchange. Before discussing the principal aspects of the
reform and its effects, I start with a historical perspective of the main characteristics
of the London Stock Exchange prior to the deregulation.4
4See Kerr (1986), Plender (1986) and Clemons and Weber (1989) for a more detailed description
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II.I London’s market prior to the 1986 deregulation
In the early eighties the London Stock Exchange was a walking anachronism.5 The
Exchange was dominated by a few members, was highly regulated and securities were
exchanged on the trading floor. Firms could participate to the London Stock Exchange
either as brokers or as jobbers. The broker acted on behalf of his client wishing to buy or
sell shares, while the jobber had a position on a given stock or bond and would buy from
brokers with clients who wanted to sell and sell from brokers with clients who wanted
to buy. Moreover, membership restrictions hindered competition: just three major
jobbers, Smith Brothers, Wedd Durlacher Mordaunt and Akroyd & Smithers had a
market share of 75% and along with a handful of brokers they controlled the market in
London. Not only were there few banks operating on the Exchange, but the Exchange
practices themselves implied high costs when trading securities. Each transaction was
taxed with a 1% stamp duty and included two brokers, who took a fixed commission,
and the jobber, who took the spread, the difference between his buying and his selling
price.6 As a matter of comparison the NYSE, as well as the other US stock exchanges,
abandoned fixed commissions on shares transactions in 1975.
Already in 1979, shortly before Margaret Thatcher took office as prime minister,
the Office of Fair Trading launched an investigation into the restrictive practices of
the London Stock Exchange, in particular the system of fixed minimum commissions,
which resulted in a court proceeding against the Exchange in October 1979.7 Beside
the Office of Fair Trading, the situation also worried the Bank of England, which was
among the promoters of deregulation. First, since its statutory obligation was to raise
money for the government on the cheapest possible terms, the Bank of England wanted
the Stock Exchange to provide a suitable Gilts market-place.8 Moreover, even after
the nationalization of 1946, the Bank of England continued to act as an informal trade
association for the promotion of City interests, and managed to persuade officials and
5See Kerr (1986)
6The stamp duty is a tax on share transactions of UK incorporated companies
7The Office of Fair Trading, established by the Fair Trading Act 1973 and closed on April 2014, was a non-ministerial
government department of the United Kingdom responsible for protecting consumer interests
8Gilts are British Government Bonds, traded through the Stock Exchange
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ministers that the City’s earnings were important and that there was an opportunity
both to preserve and to increase jobs in an important part of the service sector of the
economy.
Another argument in favor of the change was the competitive pressure, exerted in
particular from the American and the Japanese stock exchanges. As highlighted by
many practitioners, an Exchange needs to be efficient and attractive.9 Still, the fixed-
minimum broking commissions, the margin between buying and selling prices demanded
by the very few jobbers and the stamp duty of 1% imposed by the British government,
all ensured that London was an expensive place to trade securities. After many discus-
sions and facing fierce opposition, especially from existing exchange members reluctant
to abandon fixed commissions, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Cecil
Parkinson and the Chairman of the London Stock Exchange Sir Nicholas Goodison
reached an agreement in the summer of 1983, which resulted in the withdrawal of
the case brought against the London Stock exchange by the General Director of Fair
Trading, with a little more than a three years time table leading towards regulation.
II.II The 1986 deregulation and its consequences
The London Stock Exchange deregulation, known as Big Bang, was part of the 1986
Financial Services Act, passed by Margaret Thatcher during her second government to
regulate the financial services industry. The 1986 deregulation affected many aspects
of the exchange, which was previously run as a kind of private club, and changed the
face of the UK securities market almost behind recognition.10
First, fixed trade commissions were eliminated, with rates de facto open for nego-
tiations, and stamp duty was cut to 0.5% from 1%.11 Second, the separation between
jobbers and brokers was abolished and the ban for foreign banks to become member
of the exchange was lifted. With the elimination of the prohibition against performing
9See Clemons and Weber (1989).
10Sir Kenneth Berrill, former Chairman of the Securities and Investments Board (SIB). The Securities and Investments
Board (SIB), later renamed Financial Services Authority (FSA), was the agency responsible for the regulation of the
financial services industry in the United Kingdom.
11See Bond et al. (2005).
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both functions, most firms chose to operate in dual-capacity, with broker-dealer services
and market making operated within a single firm. Even before the Big Bang a number
of acquisitions and mergers took place, with a striking change in the nature and the
number of participants: following the Big Bang nearly 200 players were active, including
major foreign banks. UK retail banks, meanwhile, were free to set up integrated invest-
ment banking operations for the first time: for example, Barclays adopted a one-bank
strategy in 1985 and expanded into merchant banking activities with the purchase of
stock-trading companies de Zoete and Wedd (later Barclays de Zoete Wedd) and into
market-making and stock-brokering.
The role of technology was also pivotal for promoting the London Stock Exchange
after deregulation, with hundreds of millions of pounds invested in communication sys-
tems and the introduction of SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automation Quotation System),
based on NASDAQ. Whereas Stock Exchange members fiercely competed before the
Big Bang to have the best place on the trading floor, screen-based trading, which at
the beginning was conceived only as an alternative to the floor, became rapidly supe-
rior. The design of the so-called upstairs dealing rooms and the different mechanism
of telephone trading made possible better interaction between different bank divisions
and between banks and investors compared to the floor.
Another aspect frequently neglected in the Big Bang chronicles has been the intro-
duction of an additional flotation method. Prior to the reform, rights offerings was the
only method of issuing seasoned equity in the UK. With rights offering, current share-
holders only are allowed to purchase shares pro rata (proportionate to their existing
ownership position) at a specified exercise price until a designated expiration date. On
the contrary, following the Big Bang UK firms were able also to conduct placings. With
placing, non current shareholders can buy newly issued shares, with investment banks
usually underwriting the offer.
The Big Bang had almost immediate effects on the London stock exchange, including
increased trading volume, reduced spreads and increased trading of foreign securities.
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According to a report of the International Stock Exchange12, while commissions for
small trades rose slightly, institutional rates fell more than 30% and half of the equity
turnover was done net, with no commissions at all. Therefore, along with a reduction
in transaction costs, it seems reasonable to deduce that the London Big Bang provided
the stock market in London with a totally new impetus and a joint combination of an
increased amount of information producers and improved interaction between banks
and their clients ultimately decreased the information asymmetry between firms and
investors. As highlighted by Clemons and Weber (1989), the London Big Bang has
been the most rapid and complete regulatory reform of any market, and the most
striking example of a regulatory event engineered to benefit the local financial industry.
Moreover, the London Big Bang likely was not been conceived to foster innovation
in the United Kingdom. For all these reasons, the Big Bang arguably represents an
exogenous shock to stock market characteristics, and seems well suited to analyze the
effect of financial development on innovation.
III Data, variable measurement and summary statistics
III.I Sample selection
I construct my hand-collected data set from various databases. I collect corporation-
year patents and citations from the last version of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) Patent Database and company financial information from Thomson
Reuters Datastream and DTI-Cambridge during the period from 1981 to 1992. I focus
the main part of my analysis on patents filed in the US by British individuals or
non-government institutions in manufacturing industries, because patents play a more
pivotal role in manufacturing industries than in other industries.
One challenge that immediately arises when analyzing patents filed in the US by
foreign firms is that, unlike for US firms, there is not a unique firm identifier and
firms are not linked to Compustat. Moreover, firms may register patents with different
12The International Stock Exchange (ISE) was the former name of the London Stock Exchange
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company names or through different subsidiaries, and in this case the Patent Office
assigns to each patent a different firm identifier code. The sampling methodology I
utilize to build up manually my database can be illustrated with a simple example.
Avon Rubber, a global leader in tyre design and production, has been listed on the
London Stock Exchange since 1933. In order to try to consider all the patents filed
by Avon Rubber from 1981 to 1992, I search not only patents filed by an entity with
the name “Avon Rubber”, but also by entities with a similar name, including potential
typographical errors. In 1981, I find in the patent database a patent filed by “Avon
Inflatables LTD”. In order to decide whether I shall insert it in my sample, I screen
the available public information (firm web site and Google) to understand if Avon
Inflatables LTD is related to the listed company Avon Rubber. First, I find in Google
that Avon Inflatables Ltd is a manufacturer of inflatable boats and belonged to Avon
Rubber until 1994. I further check on Avon Rubber website and find that in fact the
listed company Avon Rubber started in 1959 the production on a range of inflatable
boats. Therefore, I include this patent on my sample. I keep on this procedure for the
following years and include patents filed by entities with the name “Avon Ind Polymers
LTD”, “Avon Rubber CO LTD”, and “Avon Rubber PC”. Still, I do not include a
patent filed by “Avon Murdock LTD”, which is a patent registered by the inventor
George Murdoch and is not related by any means to Avon Rubber. Additionally I also
count patent citations, which are a measure of innovation quality.
The sample selection procedure results in a panel containing 41 British firms listed
on the London Stock Exchange which I observe for 12 years. In order to address the
concern that my results are driven by unobserved industry level trends, I collect a sample
of 34 Dutch firms and 28 Italian firms which I also observe for 12 years. In fact, if a
technological shock happened simultaneously with the London Big Bang in industries
that are more external finance dependent, then the observed increase in patenting
activity could be driven by an unobserved shock and not by the London Big Bang itself.
While the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have historical and geographical ties,
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Italy reformed its Stock Exchange considerably later.13For these reasons, they both
seems a well suited control group to address this concern.14
In my industry level analysis I assign patents to industries instead of assigning patents
to firms and eventually firms to industries as I do in my firm level analysis described
above. Since the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) assigns patents
to three-digit technology classes, I follow the Hsu et al. (2014) mapping strategy for the
conversion from three-digit technology classes to the SIC final product classification. I
convert patents or citations by multiplying the number of patents or citations assigned
to firms belonging to a given three-digit technology to its correspondent weight. For
example, if out of hundred patents of the USPTO class 1 seventy of them belong to
firms of the SIC class 35 and thirty of them belong to firms of the SIC class 36, then the
corresponding weights are 0.7 for SIC class 35 and 0.3 for the SIC class 36. Therefore,
a patent in a given year belonging to the USPTO class 1 will count as 0.7 patent for
the SIC class 35 and 0.3 patent for the SIC class 36. An implicit assumption of this
method is that public firms’ patent class distribution in the UK is equal to public firms’
patent class distribution in the US. The same assumption, namely that public firms’
patent class distribution is constant over countries, has been made by Hsu et al. (2014)
and seems reasonable for my purposes. This procedure has the following advantage:
whereas my manually built database allows me to track innovation activity at firm level,
it may miss subsidiaries bearing a very different and unrelated name from the parent
company. Therefore, by following this mapping strategy I can address the concern that
my results are driven by my classification.
13The reorganization of the Italian Stock Exchange, with exchange agents losing their monopoly for stock exchange
contracting and the introduction of electronic trading, took place in 1991.
14France reformed its Stock Exchange in 1987 with the so-called ”Le Petit Bang”, when foreign banks, brokerage
houses and French financial institutions were allowed to buy equity in French stockbrokers. Germany introduced a
computer-based price information system in 1987 and launched the DAX index in 1988.
III. DATA, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 37
III.II Variables measurement
Measuring innovation
While it has been common practice in the finance literature to use both R&D expendi-
tures and patents as a proxy for firm innovation activity, my observation period forces
me to use patent-based metrics only, since in the UK only in 1989 a new accounting
standard, SSAP 13, required UK firms to disclose R&D expenditures.15 Still, although
previous works show that only a fraction of innovative firms use the patent system,
Trajtenberg (1990) and Griliches et al. (1986) show that widely accepted patent-based
metrics better measure research productivity than R&D investments, and they have
been used in many previous studies.16 Furthermore, whereas my observation period
precludes using R&D expenditures, it alleviates the concern that a firm could strategi-
cally decide not patenting an inventive idea in order to maintain an invention secret. As
highlighted in a recent survey paper by Hall et al. (2014), a firm may face the patent-
secrecy trade-off. This trade-off was already present in the 80’s, but the America In-
ventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) of 1999 further reduced the attractiveness of patenting
versus the use of secrecy. In fact, after the AIPA’s introduction, firms were forced to
disclose information about their patent applications within 18 months after the filing
date, while prior to AIPA only information regarding eventually granted patents were
disclosed.17
Following the procedure described before, I construct my two proxies of firm inno-
vation from the last version of the NBER Patent Database, initially created by Hall
et al. (2005). The database contains detailed information on patents granted by the
USPTO from 1976 to 2006; for each patent granted, information is available on patent
assignee name, year of application, year of grant and the number of citations received,
while unsuccessful applications are not recorded. An appealing feature of USPTO data
15see Hall and Lerner (2010).
16see Hall et al. (2013) for an investigation in the UK and Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) for US manufacturing
firms, and Seru (2014).
17Saidi and Zaldokas (2016) exploit the AIPA as an exogenous shock to firms’ public-information disclosure and show
that firms in industries that were affected more heavily by this legal change (i.e. industries with a big lag between patent
applications and grant dates) were significantly more likely to switch bank.
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is that they include patents from non-US based companies. Given the pivotal role of
the U.S. economy, I assume that all important inventions from UK companies have
been patented in the U.S.. In particular, my approach follows the spirit of Acharya and
Subramanian (2009): when they analyze the effect of national bankruptcy codes on
innovation, they implicitly assume that their firms are affected by country conditions
in terms of financing while they register their patents in the US.
Based on these information, I construct my first measure of firm annual innovation
output Pati,t by aggregating the number of patent applications filed in a year by a
given firm six years before and six years after the deregulation. A concern for counting
patents granted as a proxy for innovation is that this measure, although intuitive, does
not differentiate between ground-breaking inventions and incremental technological dis-
coveries. I construct my second innovation measure Citi,t, by aggregating the number
of forward patents citing the patents of a given firm. As suggested in prior studies
(e.g., Trajtenberg (1990); Harhoff et al. (1999); Aghion et al. (2013)), patent citations
better capture the invention’s influence and may better assess innovation quality and
its market value.
Analogously, I construct my industry level innovation measures Patj,t and Citj,t by
aggregating the number of applications filed and the number of citations in two digit
industry j, that are eventually granted to firms of a given industry. In accordance with
Griliches et al. (1986), I also calculate annual patent counts based on each patent’s ap-
plication year instead of its grant year, as the application year better captures the actual
effective time of innovation. Moreover, I exclude patents filed by the UK government
because its patents are less likely driven by financial market development (Bravo-Biosca
(2007)).
Measuring external finance dependence
I use first the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure to categorize firms and industries
in my data set as being more, or less, dependent on external finance. The underlying
idea is that a firm or an industry with a high external finance dependence measure uses
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more external finance to fund its investment, both in fixed and intangible assets. In
the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) I assume that capital markets in the United
States are relatively frictionless, and therefore the United States are the best market to
determine an industry’s technological demand for external financing. If a firm is active
in more than one sector, as for example the British confectionery company Cadbury, I
take the average of the two sector measures to which it belongs, following the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) used in Rajan and Zingales (1998). For
instance, Cadbury measure of external finance would be the average of the 311, Food
products sector and the 313, Beverages sector.
Then I construct a dummy variable, Depj, which equals one for firms above the firms’
median external finance dependence and zero for firms below the firms’ median exter-
nal finance dependence. The Rajan and Zingales (1998) external finance dependence
measure pertains to firms from the 1980s in the US, and by applying it to UK firms I
therefore assume persistence across country, namely that firms belonging to the same
sector in the UK and in the US have the same need of external finance. Since firms
could alter their measure of external finance (for example by hiring more engineers,
which has a direct impact on firm’s cash flows), I believe that for endogeneity reasons
the US measure is better suited to my analysis. Still, I also use in robustness tests an
external finance dependence measure based on British firms, DepUKj, and the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) dependence on external equity measure, DepEQj. The external
finance dependence measure based on British firms is defined as the ratio of Capital
Expenditures minus Free Cash Flow from Operations over Capital Expenditures. Since
the DTI Cambridge Database, which contains comprehensive financial information on
British Manufacturing firms, does not report Capital Expenditures, I use Datastream
instead. First, I calculate free cash flow from operations as funds from operations plus
decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. Then I
calculate each firm’s dependence on external finance, FirmDepUKj,t, as capital ex-
penditures minus free cash flow from operations, all divided by capital expenditures.
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Then I take for each observation year the median of the firms belonging to a given
industry. Finally I obtain my industry’s dependence on external finance, DepUKj as
the median of my yearly industry observations. The measure of dependence on external
equity DepEQj that I borrow from Rajan and Zingales (1998) is calculated as the ratio
of the net amount of equity issues to capital expenditures.
III.III Summary statistics
—Insert Table 1 about here—
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of my firm level analysis. British high external
finance dependent firms increase their innovation output after the London Big Bang,
while low external finance dependent firms do not increase their innovation output. On
the contrary, Italian firms show constant innovation output, both in terms of number of
patents and number of citations, while the increase in the number of citations of Dutch
firms is common to high and low external finance dependent firms.
—Insert Table 2 about here—
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of my innovation measures and external
finance dependence from 1984 to 1989 across the twenty SIC industries that I consider
in my industry level analysis. Patenting-prone industries such as Chemicals and Allied
Products (SIC 28), Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and Components (SIC
36), and Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment (SIC 35)
exhibit high level of innovation both in terms of patents and citations: they produce on
average 406 patents, 327 patents, and 300 patents per year with 3141, 2908 and 2690
citations respectively.
IV Empirical analysis
IV.I Firm level analysis
In this section I present my main results and discuss the main findings.
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One of the biggest challenges of my research question is to establish a causal effect
between financial development and innovation. In order to address this issue, I exploit
the 1986 London Big Bang as a large and exogenous shock to stock market development.
My identification strategy consists in isolating the Big Bang effects on firm behaviour
by studying differential post reform changes across different industries in the United
Kingdom. According to their growth prospects, firms have different need of external
finance and therefore I expect their reaction to the Big Bang to be different. I use the
Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external finance dependence to categorize firms
as being more or less dependent on external finance. In fact, firms highly dependent
on external finance should benefit more from the Big Bang, in terms of innovation,
compared to firms that rely more on internal cash flows to finance innovative projects.
The first equation I run at firm level is:
Innovationi,t = α1 + β1 ∗Depj ∗BigBangt + δ ∗Xi,t + µi + γt + ei,t (2.1)
Innovationi,t is one of my two measures of innovation output, namely the number
of patent Patsi,t and the number of citations Citsi,t. BigBangt is a dummy that
equals one if an observation is of 1987 onwards and zero otherwise, Depj is a dummy
that equals one if a firm belongs to an industry with high external finance dependence
measure and 0 otherwise, Xi,t is a vector of control variables, µi are firm or industry
fixed effects and γt are year fixed effects.
—Insert Figure 1 about here—
In Figure 1, I plot the timeline of my identification strategy. In order to deal with
a potential endogeneity issue, in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) I consider the
US as the most highly developed and liberal financial market in the world in which
firms are likely to face the least constraints to raising equity finance. I borrow their
measure of external finance dependence, calculated as capital expenditures minus cash
flow from operations divided by capital expenditures.
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—Insert Table 3 about here—
Table 3 reports the effect of the London Big Bang on the British sample at firm level,
with Patsi,t as dependent variable in Panel A and Citsi,t in Panel B. When I interpret
the regression results, I focus on the sign and significance level of the interaction effect
β1. Since my dependent variables Innovationi,t may be auto-correlated over time, in
order to avoid inflated t-statistics I follow Petersen (2009). In particular, I cluster
standard errors by firm when using firm fixed effects (column 1) and by industry when
using industry fixed effects (column 2). In column (3), I add firm’s fixed assets as a
control variable. In all these three specifications coefficient estimates of β1 are positive
and significative. In specification (1) their estimates are 6.11 for patent counts and
34.15 for citation counts respectively. These results show that patenting activity of
firms belonging to more external finance dependent industries is increasing after the
Big Bang, consistent with theory predictions suggesting that an improvement in stock
market development promotes economic growth in sectors that are more dependent on
external finance. In unreported regressions I run equation (1) with a discrete measure
of external finance dependence and find similar results.
In order to mitigate the concern that industry trends only lead my results, I extend
my analysis by including listed Dutch and Italian manufacturing firms. The second
equation I run at firm level is:
Innovationi,t = α1 + β1 ∗ Countryi ∗BigBangt + β2 ∗BigBangt ∗Depj
+β3 ∗ Countryi ∗BigBangt ∗Depj + µi + γt + ei,t
(2.2)
In this specification I add the term Countryi, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is from
the UK and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest β3 is the interaction term between
the Big Bang, the UK and the external finance dependence measure.
—Insert Table 4 about here—
Table 4 reports the regression results: coefficient estimates of β4 are positive and
significative. This suggests that high external finance dependent firms benefit from the
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Big Bang in terms of innovation in the UK only, which mitigates the concern that an
unobserved technological trend at industry level drives my results.
—Insert Table 5 about here—
In Table 5 I test the parallel trends assumption and find that the coefficient of interest
is not significantly different from zero.
IV.II Industry level analysis
Main results
In this section I present and discuss my findings of the industry level analysis.
My baseline equation is:
Innovationj,t = α1 + β1 ∗BigBangt + β2 ∗Depj + β3 ∗Depj ∗BigBangt + ej,t (2.3)
The dependent variable Innovationj,t is one of my two measures of the innovation
output, namely Patsj,t or Citsj,t. The measure Patsj,t counts the number of successful
patents applications per industry in a given year, while the measure Citsj,t does the
same for the number of non-self-citations. Unlike the firm level analysis, in the industry
level analysis I use the Hsu et al. (2014) mapping strategy and assign patents directly
to industries. BigBangt is a dummy that equals one if an industry-year observation is
from a year after the Big Bang and zero otherwise. The external finance dependence
measure, Depj, is the measure of external finance dependence for industry j over the
observation period and equals one if an industry is high external finance dependent
and 0 otherwise. In order to deal with a potential endogeneity issue, I borrow the
Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external finance dependence. The interaction
term Depj ∗BigBangt captures the post-differential effect of the Big Bang.
—Insert Table 6 about here—
Table 6 reports the effect of the London Big Bang on industry innovation output.
When I interpret the regression results, I focus on the sign and significance level of
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the interaction effect β3. If it is positive and significant, it shows that stock market
development exerts a disproportionately positive effect on industries that are highly
dependent on external finance. In row (1), I run the regression with Patsj,t as dependent
variable. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term β3 is 19.37. Since it is positive
and economically and statistically significant, it suggests that industries more external
finance dependent benefit from a development of the stock market conditions. In row
(2), I run the same regression with Citst,j as dependent variable in order to examine
the effects of financial market development on innovation quality. The coefficient β3
on the interaction effect is positive and economically and statistically significant. Its
estimate is 156.62; therefore, industries more external finance dependent benefit from
a development of the stock market conditions also in terms of innovation quality. I
show evidence also in my industry analysis that stock market development promotes
innovation in industries that are more dependent on external finance. Therefore, I
alleviate the concern that my results at firm level are driven by my manual classification.
Further analysis
In this section I run regression (3) with two alternative measures of external finance
dependence. I use first the Rajan and Zingales (1998) dependence on external equity
measure, DepEQj, calculated as the ratio of the net amount of equity issues to capital
expenditures. Second, I use an external finance dependence measure calculated with
listed British firms financial data, namely DepUKj.
—Insert Table 7 about here—
Table 7 reports the results of running equation (3) with these two alternative external
finance dependence measures. The results are consistent with what I obtained with the
previous measure Depj, and confirm that the London Big Bang has been particularly
beneficial to firms belonging to high external financial industries.
—Insert Table 8 about here—
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In table 8 I extend my sample to all the industries of the SIC spectrum (from SIC 1
to SIC 99). With a difference in DiD, I run the following equation:
Innovationj,t = α1 + β1 ∗BigBangt + β2 ∗Depj + β3 ∗Manufacturingj
+β4 ∗Depj ∗BBt + β5 ∗Depj ∗Manufacturingj
+β6 ∗BBt ∗Manufacturingj + β7 ∗BBt ∗Manufacturingj ∗Depj + ej,t
(2.4)
Coefficient estimates of β7 , the triple interaction term between the Big Bang, the
external finance dependence measure and Manufacturing are positive and significative,
showing that the Big Bang has been particularly beneficial to manufacturing industries.
—Insert Table 9 about here—
In table 9 I run a test to address a crucial assumption in difference-in-differences
regressions, namely, that of parallel trends. By dividing the sample in two (high external
finance dependence industries and low external finance dependence industries), I find
that coefficient estimates of EarlyBigBangt ∗ Depj, which is a dummy variable that
equals one if the year is within four years prior to the London Big Bang and the industry
belongs to the high external finance dependence subsample, is insignificantly different
from zero. Finally, I run equation (3) with industry and time fixed effects and with a
discrete external finance dependence variable and find similar results (unreported).
IV.III Mechanism
In this section I examine a possible mechanism through which an improvement in stock
market development reducing the cost of external funds could foster innovation in more
external finance dependent firms.
Along with a substantial increase in trading volume, British firms gained the flex-
ibility to conduct placing, while before the stock market reform rights offerings were
the only method of issuing seasoned equity. While theoretical models back up this
argument, just after the London Big Bang many practitioners were confident that
larger UK companies would be able to raise high sums of fresh capital with greater
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ease and efficiency.18. As a first possible mechanism, I investigate in the DiD frame-
work how firms react to the Big Bang in terms of their reliance on equity financing.
Thomson Reuters Datastream provides the number of shares outstanding, while the
DTI-Cambridge database provides the number of new ordinary and preferred shares is-
sued during a given year, which I use to calculate a proxy of Seasoned Equity Offerings
proceeds.
—Insert Table 10 about here—
Results are reported in Table 10: in row (1), the dependent variable is the number of
shares outstanding, namely Sharesi,t. The interaction term between the Big Bang and
the external finance dependence measure is not significant. In row (2) I use my proxy
of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOi,t ), which I obtain by multiplying the sum of the
number of new preferred and ordinary shares issued during a year by the average of
the stock price at the beginning of the year and the stock price at the end of the year.
Also in this case the interaction term in the DiD setting is not significant. Therefore,
whereas both groups of firms increase the number of shares outstanding and their
SEO’s proceeds after the Big Bang (run in an unreported regression), there is not
direct evidence that firms more dependent on external finance increase equity more
than firms less dependent on external finance.
Next, I study the issue of long term loans, which are provided on annual basis by the
DTI-Cambridge Database. In row (3) I run the same regression with LoansIssuei,t as
dependent variable while in row (4) I scale it by the total fixed assets of the previous
year. The DiD estimator on loans issue is negative and economically and statistically
significant in both equations. This suggest that firms belonging to more external finance
dependent industries decrease their loans issue or even repay their outstanding loans
after the London Big Bang. Moreover, British firms, including those more dependent on
external finance, increase their equity after the Big Bang. These findings are consistent
with the theoretical arguments on the role of equity and debt in financing innovative
18see Ian Kerr, Head of international fixed income research and advisory group at Kidder, Peabody International
Limited, a securities firm. For the theory model, see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989)
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projects. For instance, Allen and Gale (1999) show that market financed projects are
characterized by higher diversity of opinion than bank financed projects.
V Conclusions
In this paper I investigate the effect of an improvement of stock market development on
corporate innovation. The innovation process, due to its intrinsic nature, has uncertain
results and high probability of failure. In this paper I provide evidence that better
developed stock markets not only could be beneficial for the local financial services
industry, but also be helpful for promoting innovation. My identification strategy uses
the 1986 London Big Bang as an exogenous shock to stock market development. The
London Big Bang provided the London Stock Exchange with a totally new impetus
and broke up many of the customs and practices prevailing in the City of London.
In particular, it resulted in the deregulation of fixed brokerage commissions, the ter-
mination of restrictions on the Exchange membership and the consequent admission
of foreign firms. Moreover, the introduction of electronic trading rapidly replaced the
old-fashioned trading floor.
While it is widely known that the London Big Bang played a pivotal role in promoting
London as a leading financial centre, I provide evidence of its beneficial role to the
real economy in the UK with regards to innovation. With a DiD setting, I compare
the innovation output of firms belonging to high external finance dependent industries
to a control sample of firms belonging to low external finance dependent industries.
Consistent with the literature on financial development, I show that firms belonging
to more external finance dependent industries increase their innovation output after
the London Big Bang. In addition, the same effect on innovation is not present for a
sample of non-British listed firms unaffected by the deregulation. Finally I inspect a
potential mechanism that could contribute to these findings: firms belonging to high
external finance dependent industries increase their equity and, in addition, decrease
their loan financing after the deregulation significatively more than firms belonging
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to low external finance dependent industries. Thus, equity financing instead of debt
financing could result in higher innovation levels for these firms.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (Firm level analysis)
This table reports summary statistics of my innovation measures both for the British, Dutch and
Italian firms, namely patents counts and citations counts. The observation period is from 1981 to
1992.
Panel A
Patent counts
Firms Average (12 yrs) Average (6 yrs) Average, before BB Average, after BB
UK 41 11 11 10 13
UK, High EFD 19 16 17 14 19
UK, Low EFD 22 7 8 8 7
Netherlands 34 6 6 5 6
Netherlands, High EFD 19 4 3 3 4
Netherlands, Low EFD 15 8 8 7 8
Italy 28 5 5 5 5
Italy, High EFD 13 6 6 6 6
Italy, Low EFD 15 4 3 3 4
Panel B
Citations counts
Firms Average (12 yrs) Average (6 yrs) Average, before BB Average, after BB
UK 41 88 98 92 103
UK, High EFD 19 140 158 142 173
UK, Low EFD 22 54 58 60 56
Netherlands 34 45 44 38 49
Netherlands, High EFD 18 33 30 25 35
Netherlands, Low EFD 19 59 59 54 63
Italy 28 31 30 33 27
Italy, High EFD 13 39 40 46 33
Italy, Low EFD 15 22 18 16 20
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (Industry level analysis)
This table reports summary statistics at industry level of my innovation measures classified according to the Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014) mapping strategy.
The sample period is from 1984 to 1989.
SIC Industries Patents Citations
20 Food and Kindred Products 23 190
21 Tobacco Products 5 25
22 Textile Mill Products 4 29
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products, made from Fabrics and Similar Materials 2 14
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 3 28
25 Furniture and Fixtures 11 108
26 Paper and Allied Products 58 569
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 7 57
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 406 3141
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 58 419
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 29 232
31 Leather and Leather Products 1 11
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 35 287
33 Primary Metal Industries 33 223
34 Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery and Transportation Equipment 43 327
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 300 2690
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, except Computer Equipment 327 2908
37 Transportation Equipment 274 2007
38 Measuring, Analyzing, Controlling Instr.; Photographic, Medical, Optical goods, Watches, Clocks 169 1649
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 12 119
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Table 2.3: Firm level analysis
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationi,t = α1 +β1 ∗Depj ∗BigBangt+
δ ∗ Xi,t + µi + γt + ei,t. Innovationi,t is one of the two measures of the innovation output (either
Patsi,t in Panel A or Citsi,t in Panel B). The measure Patsi,t counts the number of successful patents
applications per firm i in year t. The measure Citsi,t counts the number of forward patents citing the
patents of firm i in year t. BigBangt is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from
the year after 1986 and zero otherwise. Depj is a dummy that equals one if an observation belongs to
an industry with high external finance dependence measure and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of control
variables, µi are firm fixed effects and γt are time fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term
(unreported). Standard errors are clustered by firm in column (1) and (3) and by industry in column
(2). Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The sample
period is from 1984 to 1989.
Panel A
Dependent variable: patent counts
(1) (2) (3)
DiD 6.11* 6.11* 11.34*
(3.33) (3.41) (6.67)
Firm FE YES NO YES
Industry FE NO YES NO
Year FE YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES
Obs 246 246 142
R2 0.07 0.03 0.12
Panel B
Dependent variable: citation counts
(1) (2) (3)
DiD 34.15* 34.15** 55.33*
(18.28) (15.82) (31.67)
Firm FE YES NO YES
Industry FE NO YES NO
Year FE YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES
Obs 246 246 142
R2 0.03 0.06 0.12
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Table 2.4: Firm level analysis, UK sample and control group
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationi,t = α1 + β1 ∗ BigBangt ∗
Countryi + β2 ∗ BigBangt ∗Depj + β3 ∗Depj ∗ BigBangt ∗ Countryi + µi + γt + ei,t. Innovationi,t
is one of the two measures of the innovation output (either Patsi,t or Citsi,t). The measure Patsi,t
counts the number of successful patents applications per firm i in year t. The measure Citsi,t counts
the number of forward patents citing the patents of firm i in year t. BigBangt is a dummy that equals
one if an firm-year observation is from the year after 1986 and zero otherwise. Depj is a dummy that
equals one if an observation belongs to an industry with high external finance dependence measure
and 0 otherwise. Countryi is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation belongs to a British
firm and zero otherwise. µi are firm fixed effects and γt are time fixed effects. All regressions include
a constant term (unreported). Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The sample period is from 1984 to 1989.
Innovation DiD Firm FE Obs R2
Patents (1) 6.00*** YES 630 0.06
(1.31)
Citations (2) 30.16*** YES 630 0.06
(10.49)
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Table 2.5: Firm level analysis, parallel trends
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationi,t = α1 +β1 ∗EarlyBigBangt +
β2 ∗Depj + β3 ∗Depj ∗ EarlyBigBangt + µi + γt + ei,t. Innovationi,t is one of the two measures of
the innovation output (either Patsi,t or Citsi,t). The measure Patsi,t counts the number of successful
patents applications per firm i in year t. The measure Citsi,t counts the number of forward patents
citing the patents of firm i in year t. EarlyBigBangt is a dummy that equals one if an firm-year
observation is from a year after 1983 and zero otherwise. Depj is a dummy that equals one if an
observation belongs to an industry with high external finance dependence measure and 0 otherwise. µi
are firm fixed effects and γt are time fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term (unreported).
Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***,
**, and *, respectively. The sample period is from 1981 to 1986.
Innovation DiD Firm FE Year FE Obs R2
Patents (1) -1.82 YES YES 246 0.02
(2.48)
Citations (2) -2.99 YES YES 246 0.002
(35.33)
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Table 2.6: Industry level analysis
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationj,t = α1 + β1 ∗BigBangt + β2 ∗
Depj +β3Dependencej ∗BBt+ej,t. Innovationj,t is one of the two measures of the innovation output
(either Patsj,t in row (1) or Citsj,t in row (2). The measure Patsj,t counts the number of successful
patents applications per industry j in year t. The measure Citsj,t counts the number of forward patents
citing the patents in industry j that are invented by individuals or non-government institutions in year
t. BigBangt is a dummy that equals one if an industry-year observation is from the year after 1986
and zero otherwise. Depj is a dummy that equals one if an observation belongs to an industry with
high external finance dependence measure and 0 otherwise. ej,t denotes the error term. All regressions
include a constant term (unreported). Robust standard errors clustered by industry are reported in
parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. My
sample includes industries with two-digit SIC codes between 20 and 39. The sample period is from
1984 to 1989.
Innovation Big Bang DiD Obs R2
Patents (1) -15.60* 19.37*** 120 0.29
(8.54) (8.19)
Citations (2) -131.54* 156.62*** 120 0.30
(70.64) (64.93)
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Table 2.7: Industry level analysis, alternative measures of external finance dependence
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationj,t = α1 + β1 ∗BigBangt + β2 ∗
DepMeasurej + β3DepMeasurej ∗BigBangt + ej,t. Innovationj,t is one of the two measures of the
innovation output (either Patsj,t in row (1) and (3) or Citsj,t in row (2) and (4)). The measure Patsj,t
counts the number of successful patents applications per industry j in year t. The measure Citsj,t
counts the number of forward patents citing the patents in industry j that are invented by individuals
or non-government institutions in year t. BigBangt is a dummy that equals one if an industry-year
observation is from the year after 1986 and zero otherwise. In rows (1) and (2) DepMeasurej is
DepEQj , the measure of external finance dependence for industry j borrowed from the equity finance
measure of Rajan and Zingales (net amount of equity issues to capital expenditures), while in rows (3)
and (4) it is DepUKj , namely the measure calculated with the UK data. ej,t denotes the error term.
All regressions include a constant term (unreported). Robust standard errors clustered by industry
are reported in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *,
respectively. My sample includes industries with two-digit SIC codes between 20 and 39. The sample
period is from 1984 to 1989.
Innovation Big Bang DiD Obs R2
Patents (1) -15.08 20.39*** 120 0.28
(10.57) (9.80)
Citations (2) -148.90 180.21*** 120 0.30
(81.36) (74.79)
Patents (3) -8.06 14.34* 120 0.34
(11.28) (8.73)
Citations (4) -91.41 129.87* 120 0.26
(87.13) (68.96)
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Table 2.8: Industry level analysis, Difference in Difference in Differences
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationj,t = α1 + β1 ∗BigBangt + β2 ∗
Depj +β3 ∗Manufacturingj +β4 ∗Depj ∗BigBangt+β5 ∗Depj ∗Manufacturingj +β6 ∗BigBangt ∗
Manufacturingj + β7 ∗ BigBangt ∗Manufacturingj ∗Depj + ej,t. Innovationj,t is one of the two
measures of the innovation output (either Patsj,t in row (1) or Citsj,t in row (2)). The measure Patsj,t
counts the number of successful patents applications per industry j in year t. The measure Citsj,t
counts the number of forward patents citing the patents in industry j that are invented by individuals
or non-government institutions in year t. BigBangt is a dummy that equals one if an industry-year
observation is from the year after 1986 and zero otherwise. Depj , is the measure of external finance
dependence for industry j over the observation period. Manufacturingj denotes industries belonging
to SIC classes from 20 to 39. ej,t denotes the error term. All regressions include a constant term
(unreported). Robust standard errors clustered by industry are reported in parenthesis. Significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. My sample includes industries
with two-digit SIC codes between 1 and 99. The sample period is from 1984 to 1989.
Innovation Big Bang Dependence DiDiD R2
Patents (1) 1.10 0.19 16.47** 0.45
(.40) (0.14) (7.03)
Citations (2) 10.62 1.85 134.26** 0.45
(51.34) (2.95) (54.55)
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Table 2.9: Industry level analysis, parallel trends
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Innovationj,t = α1 +β1 ∗EarlyBigBangt +
β2∗Depj+β3∗EarlyBigBangt∗Depj+ej,t. Innovationj,t is one of the two measures of the innovation
output (either Patsj,t in row (1) or Citsj,t in row (2)). The measure Patst,j counts the number of
successful patents applications per industry j in year t. The measure Citsj,t counts the number of
forward patents citing the patents in industry j that are invented by individuals or non-government
institutions in year t. EarlyBigBangt is a dummy that equals one if an firm-year observation is from
a year after 1983 and zero otherwise. Depj , is the measure of external finance dependence for industry
j over the observation period. ej,t denotes the error term. All regressions include a constant term
(unreported). Robust standard errors clustered by industry are reported in parenthesis. Significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The sample period is from
1981 to 1986.
Innovation Dependence DiD Obs R2
Patents (1) 91.30** -10.94 120 0.20
(37.94) (24.94)
Citations (2) 739.81** -74.70 120 0.18
(305.83) (209.11)
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Table 2.10: Possible mechanism: SEO’s and long term loans issue
This table reports the results estimating various forms of Channeli,t = α1+β1∗Depi∗BBt+µi+γt+ei,t.
Channeli,t is one of the two possible underlying mechanisms. In row (1), I use SEO proceeds, while
in row (2) I scale SEO Proceeds by total fixed assets of the previous year. In row (3) the dependent
variable is the issue of long term loans, while in row (4) I scale the issue of long term loans by total
fixed assets of the previous year. µi are firm fixed effects and γt are time fixed effects. ei,t denotes the
error term. All regressions include a constant term (unreported). Robust standard errors clustered by
firm are reported in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively. The sample period is from 1984 to 1989.
Channel DiD Firm FE Year FE Adj. R2
SEO proceeds (1) -5’315’072 YES YES 0.04
(6’105’251)
SEO proceeds, scaled (2) 2.66 YES YES 0.01
(18.64)
Issue of long term loans (3) -84’747** YES YES 0.01
(42’522)
Issue of long term loans, scaled (4) -0.10** YES YES 0.04
(0.04)
Chapter 3
Financial vs. strategig buyers: who
is waiting at the gate?
Chiarella, C., Ostinelli, D., Financial vs. strategig buyers: who is waiting at the gate?,
Working Paper, 2016
60
I. INTRODUCTION 61
I Introduction
Deal-making activity in the last three decades has been characterized by the presence of
financial sponsors (private equity firms). Yet, the fraction of financial sponsors’ activity
over total M&A activity is not constant over time. This paper addresses the following
question: how does the relative importance of financial sponsors and strategic buyers
change over time in the market for corporate control? This question is relevant not
only for understanding the dynamics of the deal making environment, but also because
of the consequences bidder identity has on target companies, in particular with regards
to organizational status, performance, corporate governance and capital structure.
Financial sponsors and strategic buyers, who potentially compete for the same in-
vestment opportunity, have several intrinsic differences. Financial sponsors usually look
for targets with high cash flow generation potential. After the acquisition, the com-
pany is temporarily part of its financial portfolio and is successively resold to a strategic
buyer or goes public through an IPO. Strategic buyers, which are more long term ori-
ented, usually aim at realizing synergies, through economies of scale or by eliminating
duplicate functions.1 Moreover, strategic buyers listed on public equity markets have
additional payment methods, since in exchange of the shares of the target company
they may offer their own shares, cash, or a combination of the two. Financial sponsors,
in contrast, pay only with cash.
Thus, the conditions of the debt and stock markets, which are important factors
for M&A activity since they affect the fundamental drivers of deal performance, may
also affect the bidding behavior of the different bidders. In accordance with this line of
inquire, in this paper we aim to understand the drivers and the dynamics of the market
for corporate control by relating financial sponsors and strategic buyers’ M&A activity
to prevailing conditions on debt and stock markets.
In the first part of our paper, we aggregate financial sponsors and strategic buyers’
M&A activity in the euro area between 2000 and 2015 over years and industries. While
1In the theoretical model of Hege et al. (2013), private equity is a transitional form of ownership, with private equity
firms acquiring an asset which will be divested via an exit auction.
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M&A activity comes in waves, our analysis shows that financial sponsors and strategic
buyers-related deal flows are not synchronous. First, we find that the relative contribu-
tion of financial sponsors grows with credit tightness and, consistently with Martos-Vila
et al. (2013), drops when the difference between their credit risk premium and strategic
buyers’ credit risk premium – which for simplicity we label yield spread – widens. We
then examine the relationship between stock market valuations and M&A activity and
find that the relative contribution of financial sponsors drops with high stock market
valuations.
Favourable conditions in debt markets are usually associated with higher M&A ac-
tivity. Harford (2005) shows that liquidity in debt markets and ease of financing are
necessary conditions for the reallocation of assets. Credit availability affects, in fact,
the financial costs and the equity contribution of acquirers. Indeed, in principle, cheap
and abundant credit allows the realization of more leveraged transactions at lower costs,
boosting the returns on deals. Furthermore, lower cost of funding potentially expands
bidders’ investment opportunity set to include larger target companies or target com-
panies with lower cash flow generation power. On both counts, favourable conditions
in debt markets are then associated with higher M&A activity.
With regards to stock markets conditions, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) identify valuations as a trigger of M&A activity, since
overvalued acquirers bid more and overvalued targets are more willing to accept offers
when valuations are high. In principle, in fact, stock market prices should reflect
future expectations grounded in economic fundamentals, such as growth opportunities
and the equity risk premium. Thus, when an economy is in good condition, bidders
are not necessarily discouraged by high valuations, as they tend to be more confident
they can achieve higher cash flows. Furthermore, stock market valuations also reflect
the cost of equity, with higher valuations corresponding to lower cost of equity. As a
consequence, future growth in performance which is not yet reflected in valuations is
more valuable when it is discounted at a lower average discount rate. This increases
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bidders’ willingness to tying up resources in less liquid and riskier investments to achieve
higher returns when valuations are high. As a consequence, then, M&A activity will
be high too.
We interpret our results as a combination of a number of factors: leverage is an
essential part of the financial sponsors’ governance model, and the need to lever up
transactions to achieve the high returns required by their investors makes financial
sponsors relatively slow to react to credit tightness. Still, while increasing credit risk
premium increases the tax benefits of debt, it also forces financial sponsors to reduce
leverage (see Axelson et al. (2013)). Moreover, when the yield spread increases, strate-
gic buyers have relatively better conditions for external funding, and therefore they
may take advantage of this situation to increase their share in the market for corporate
control. Turning to stock market valuations, we interpret our findings as reflecting
financial sponsors’ short term investment horizon combined with their inability to cap-
ture synergies, which make them relatively wary about high company valuations and
potential overpayment that would hinder their returns.2
For all our specifications, we repeat the analysis considering the subsample of deals
settled by cash only, with the aim to exclude that our findings are affected by the
method of payment, and find similar results. These findings suggest that, at least in
our sample, the additional method of payment that strategic buyers may use does not
drive our results.
Next, we turn to our deal level analysis. First, we study how the probability of a
deal being backed by a financial sponsor or a strategic buyer varies according to debt
and stock market conditions. We find that the likelihood that an acquisition is backed
by a financial sponsor decreases when the extra cost of borrowing for financial sponsors
relative to strategic buyers increases, while it is unaffected by shifts in credit availability
and stock market valuations.
Second, we investigate two main channels explaining our results at the aggregate
2Private equity investment horizon is characterized by at least two distinctive features: first, private equity funds
have a finite period in which to invest their capital (see Degeorge et al. (2016)). Second, the typical private equity fund
partnership contract stipulates that funds have a life of 10 years, with a possible extension of 3 years (see Phalippou
and Gottschalg (2009)).
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level by studying separately our subsamples of financial sponsors and strategic buyers.
First, we find that the yield spread has a substantial effect on the takeover premium
paid in deals backed by strategic buyers, but not for those backed by financial sponsors.
Second, we find that strategic buyers reduce the deal size with credit tightness, while
when stock market valuations increase, the deal size increase more for strategic buyers
than for financial sponsors.3
These findings shed further light on our industry level results. When the yield
spread increases, strategic buyers crowd out financial sponsors from the market for
corporate control, reducing at the aggregate level financial sponsor’s share both in
terms of number of deals and deal values. Furthermore, credit availability and stock
market valuations affect strategic buyers’ deal size, potentially explaining why at the
aggregate level when credit availability shrinks and stock market valuations increase,
strategic buyers respectively decrease and increase their share of the M&A volume,
while their relative number remains constant.
Our results contribute to the literature on deal making behaviour by financial spon-
sors, which originated in the late 1980s as a response to an unprecedented number
of public corporations and their divisions going private in leveraged buyout transac-
tions. The debate in the literature started by focusing on the longevity of LBOs and
their distinguishing characteristics: while Rappaport (1989) argues that the LBO or-
ganization is transitory and that high level of debt along with concentrated ownership
impose costs of inflexibility to competition and change, in his influential paper Jensen
(1997) considers the LBO a superior organization, due to its unique combination of
powerful incentives that increase efficiency and value. Jensen (1997) argues that com-
mon LBO features, such as concentrated ownership, monitoring, managerial incentives
and efficient capital structure, make LBOs preferable to public corporations, which are
characterized by dispersed shareholders and weak governance.
Since then, empirical research has scrutinized many other aspects of the effects of
financial sponsors on the company they acquire, such as operating performance, invest-
3When we exclude deals settled by stock or a combination of cash and stock we find similar results.
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ments, organizational status and capital structure. While Axelson et al. (2013) find
that buyouts have higher leverage than a matched sample of public companies, Kaplan
(1989) analyzes a sample of buyouts of public companies and finds that companies with
available post buyout financial data experience an increase in operating income and net
cash flow as well as reductions in capital expenditures. Stein (1989) interprets these
findings in two ways: on the one hand they may represent better operational efficiency
and the curtailment of negative NPV projects, but it cannot be excluded that some
positive NPV projects are eliminated as well. Focusing on the monitoring and advising
functions exerted by financial sponsors, Lerner et al. (2011) analyze a sample of LBO
transactions and find that while their overall patenting output remains unchanged, the
innovation quality of LBO firms increases in the years following the transaction.
An additional dimension potentially affected by the buyer’s type is the organizational
status. Kaplan (1991) examines 183 large LBOs completed between 1979 and 1986
from the time of their completion through August 1990. He finds that 62% of the LBO
companies remain privately owned, 14% are publicly owned and still independent, and
24% are purchased by publicly owned U.S. or foreign companies, and that the percentage
of LBOs returning to public ownership increases over time. Thus, whereas the nature
of LBO’s does not seem to be permanent, at least in the immediate years following the
takeover firms acquired by financial sponsors modify their organizational status.4
Only a few papers so far have tried to shed light on the drivers of financial sponsors
activity or to compare it with the overall M&A activity. Recent papers by Bargeron
et al. (2008), Hege et al. (2013) and Dittmar et al. (2012) focus on bidding behavior
and target premiums between strategic and financial acquirers. Gorbenko and Malenko
(2014) consider the bidding behavior of strategic versus financial bidders focusing on
how synergies cause different bidding behavior than the search for undervalued assets.
Shivdasani and Wang (2011) report that structured credit fuelled the most recent buy-
4Further research has focused on the benefits and potential detrimental effects of being listed on public equity markets,
both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective. Stein (1989) proposes a model where capital market pressure
negatively affects firm’s performance through managerial myopic behaviour while Ferreira et al. (2014) show in theory
paper that private ownership creates incentives for innovation, whereas public ownership deters innovation. Empirical
evidence on the role of public markets in nurturing innovation is mixed (see for example Acharya and Xu (2016), Hsu
et al. (2014), and Bernstein (2015)).
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out boom, using cross-sectional evidence to argue that the advent of structured credit
improved access to capital for financial sponsors. Similarly, Kaplan and Stein (1993)
observe important changes in the structure of deals with the emergence of the high
yield market. Haddad et al. (2013) offer an explanation of the time series variation of
buyout activity by which financial sponsors activity should be high when risk free rates
are high and or the risk premium is low, due to the benefits and costs of concentrated
ownership. Still, they do not consider the competition between financial and strategic
buyers.
Our paper is closest to Martos-Vila et al. (2013), which provide an explanation for
the dynamics of financial versus strategic acquisition activity focusing on mispricing
in the debt market.5 While Martos-Vila et al. (2013) measure private equity activity
as the fraction of the value of all deals for public targets accounted for by financial
sponsors, we also consider non-public targets. Since previous studies on LBOs found
that public-to-private transactions account only for a tiny portion of the overall LBO
activity, we believe that including non-public targets provides a more comprehensive
picture of the financial acquirers activity.6 Moreover, in addition to Martos-Vila et al.
(2013) we look at the propensity to embark on a transaction for different buyer types
which, along with our analysis of deal characteristics such as the takeover premium and
the deal size, allows us to better understand and interpret our findings at the aggregate
level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data collection
and provides summary statistics. In section 3 we formulate our hypotheses. Section 4
describes our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
5In addition, Malenko and Malenko (2015) provide an alternative theoretical model for financial sponsors activity
based on the variation of the risk premium, emphasizing the ability of financial sponsors’ owned firms to borrow against
their sponsors’ reputation with creditors and on other externalities.
6By looking at the type of sellers involved in a sample of French transactions, Boucly et al. (2011) find that the 4.3%
of the transactions are public to private, while Stro¨mberg (2008) finds similar results for a sample of global buyouts.
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II Data
The sample includes all completed deals by euro area strategic buyers and financial
sponsors announced in the period between 2000 and 2015. Data are collected from
Bloomberg, as this allows us to directly observe the aggregate deal flow and then classify
each individual observation on the basis of the bidder type: strategic buyer or financial
sponsor. This assures homogeneous deal coverage and common inclusion criteria across
bidder types. We include an observation in the sample if:
• the announced transaction value is above 50 million USD
• the transaction is not a buy back, is not an exchange offer, and leads to the
acquisition of 100% of the target company
• the acquirer, if belonging to the strategic buyer bidder type, is not a financial
institution
Our sample includes 2560 deals, of which 258 were executed by financial sponsors
and the remaining 2302 by strategic buyers. Figure 1 shows the yearly breakdown
of the number of deals between financial sponsors and strategic buyers and shows the
relative contribution of financial sponsors to total deal volume in Europe. Overall M&A
activity varies significantly from one year to the other and clusters in time, consistent
with the extant literature on mergers waves and valuation.7 While strategic buyers
always dominate that of financial sponsors, the fraction of financial buyers over total
M&A activity varies over time, both in terms of the number of deals and aggregate deal
volume.
—Insert Figure 1 about here—
Table 1 provides some insights into the composition of the sample. Summary statis-
tics on deal and target characteristics are presented for the whole sample and for sub-
samples of deals undertaken respectively by strategic buyers and financial sponsors. On
7Harford (2005) analyzes a sample of industry-level merger waves in the 1980s and 1990s and finds that merger waves
occur in response to specific industry shocks that require large scale reallocation of assets paired with sufficient capital
liquidity.
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average, deal value is about 812.2 million Eur and, for the set of deals for which we
have this information, a considerable 27.5% takeover premium is paid in excess of the
undisturbed market capitalization of the target before the announcement. When look-
ing at the breakdown between financial and strategic buyers, some interesting features
arise: first, average deal value does not differ significantly across different bidder types,
suggesting that on average financial and strategic buyers in our sample bid for targets
with similar size. As expected, cash is the prevalent means of payment by financial
sponsors, while a minority yet substantial share of deals by strategic buyers is settled
using stock payment.8 Consistent with Gorbenko and Malenko (2014), we also find
that strategic buyers pay on average a substantially higher takeover premium, which
suggest that strategic buyers have a greater willingness to recognize higher valuations
justified on the basis of expected synergies.
—Insert Table 1 about here—
III Hypothesis Development
While some takeovers happen following bilateral negotiations between the selling share-
holders and just one acquirer, many takeovers involve a multitude of bidders, usually
with both strategic and financial buyers competing for the target. In this competitive
environment, the value accorded to the target company and bidder’s financial con-
straints concur in determining the winner. Stock market valuations and debt market
conditions affect target company valuation and bidder’s financial constraints, respec-
tively. Due to their intrinsic differences, strategic and financial buyers respond differ-
ently to variations of these two factors; therefore, we expect that stock market valuations
and debt market conditions play an important role in determining the composition of
the M&A deal flow over time.
Financial and strategic buyers differ over several dimensions. Financial sponsors
usually have a short term investment horizon and they are primarily interested in the
8For 8 deals backed by financial sponsors the method of payment is undisclosed and for 3 deals is a combination of
stock and cash. As shown later, our results are unaffected by the exclusion of these deals.
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return they can achieve by acquiring a target company and selling it in a later point
in time.9 Financial sponsors may obtain this desired return by looking at undervalued
targets which they often reorganize in order to improve their cash flow. In contrast,
strategic buyers typically integrate the companies they buy after making sure that they
offer long-term operational synergies and fit into their strategic plans. Reasons for
acquisitions may include vertical expansion (buying a customer or a supplier), horizon-
tal expansion (new geographic markets or product lines), eliminating competition, or
enhancing some of their intrinsic capabilities, such as technology, research and devel-
opment, or marketing.
If financial and strategic buyers are capital-constrained, so that they have to raise
external debt in order to complete deals, the supply of debt and its cost potentially affect
their bidding behavior and increase or decrease their contribution to the total M&A
deal flow. As an example of the importance of the debt market for M&A activity,
the takeover boom of the 1980s was characterized by heavy use of leverage and by
noninvestment grade or junk bonds, which increased substantially throughout the 1980s
together with leveraged buyouts.10 In order to analyze the prevailing conditions of debt
markets, we disentangle credit availability from credit risk premium, which both concur
in determining financial and strategic buyers’ borrowing costs. With credit availability
we aim at capturing the ease to borrow money, which is represented by the risk free
rate. When abundant credit is available the risk free rate is low, while a high risk free
rate represents credit tightness. An increase in the risk free component of the debt
negatively affects the borrowing costs of both financial and strategic buyers. Still, since
financial sponsors have a proven ability to use debt in their acquisitions and leveraging
up transactions is part of their value creation strategy, we expect that they are less
sensitive than strategic buyers to credit tightness.11 With this regard, Axelson et al.
9For a sample of US financial sponsors, Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2009) find that in 38% of all exits financial sponsors
sell companies to a strategic buyer, in 24% to other financial sponsors and in 14% they exit their investment through an
IPO.
10Noninvestment grade or junk bonds are bonds that are rated below investment grade with higher yields and higher
risks than investment grade bonds. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) find that in the mid-to-late 1980s, more than 50
percent of junk bond issues were related to takeovers or mergers.
11The average debt to total capital ratio (i.e. long-term debt as a percentage of debt plus equity) for public companies
preceding a buyout is about 20% for public companies and increases to 85% on completion of the buyout (see Jensen
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(2013) find that buyout leverage is unaffected by variations in the risk free rate, while
leverage of comparable publicly-traded firms increases when the risk free rate is low and
vice-versa. Thus, previous empirical findings related both on different levels of leverage
and on different responsiveness to credit tightness suggest us our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): strategic buyers are more sensitive to credit tightness;
increasing risk-free rate augments financial sponsors’ share in the market for
corporate control
While credit availability affects both constrained financial sponsors and constrained
strategic buyers, their credit risk premia are different. In particular, when investors’
appetite for risk is low the credit risk premium is high, while a low credit risk premium
is a consequence of a high demand for risky assets. To estimate the effects of debt
market conditions, the literature on financial sponsors has analyzed the relationship
between leverage and the high-yield spread. Axelson et al. (2013) find that an increase
in the high-yield spread, which measures financial sponsors’ credit risk premium and is
calculated as the difference between a high-yield rate and the risk free rate, negatively
affects the leverage used in buyout transaction. Thus, if higher credit risk premium
harms financial sponsors’ willingness to borrow money, strategic buyers may take ad-
vantage to increase their share in the market for corporate control. Still, debt market
conditions affect strategic buyers’ credit risk premium too. Therefore, in order to con-
sider this joint effect, we calculate the differential credit risk premium as the difference
between a high-yield rate and an investment grade rate, which represents the extra cost
that financial sponsors have to pay to raise debt compared to strategic buyers. The
expected effect of a variation in the differential credit risk premium, or yield spread for
simplicity’s sake, is straightforward and leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the yield spread represents the extra cost paid by
financial buyers only; increasing yield spread augments strategic buyers’
share in the market for corporate control
Beside financial constraints, synergies play a pivotal role in the determination of the
(1997))
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bidding price for strategic buyers. In principle, strategic buyers should be willing to
pay more than financial sponsors, since they can implement the same changes as the
latter and, on top of that, enjoy the synergies generated by the acquisition. Gorbenko
and Malenko (2014) find indeed that strategic buyers pay on average higher takeover
premiums than financial sponsors and, more importantly, the estimated valuations of
participating bidders in auctions of companies are higher for strategic buyers, confirming
the common view that strategic bidders are willing to pay more for the average target
due to potential synergies.12
Still, the value of the synergies varies over time, and therefore affect their decision to
engage in a transaction. In particular, the value of synergies is affected by the discount
rate, which in its turn reflects stock market valuations. Higher level of price to book
ratio (P/B), our general measure of stock market valuations, implies lower discount
rate, and consequently higher synergies value, which should increase the relative im-
portance of strategic buyers in the M&A deal flow composition. This leads to our third
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): synergies affect strategic buyers’ bidding price. In-
creasing P/B ratio augments strategic buyers’ share in the market for cor-
porate control
IV Empirical Analysis
We conduct our empirical analysis of M&A activity by financial sponsors and strate-
gic buyers first at the industry level and then at the deal level. In particular, with
our industry level analysis we aim to capture the within industry effects of varying
market conditions on M&A activity by financial sponsor and strategic buyers, taking
into account the intrinsic differences across industries, such as their different appeal to
different types of bidders, and the fact that deals tend to cluster in time and industries.
Then, we corroborate our findings by analyzing, at the individual deal level, the effects
12In addition, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) find that valuations of strategic and financial bidders varies across targets
and is responsive to investment opportunities and cash flows.
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of varying stock and debt market conditions on the propensity to embark on a trans-
action for different buyer types, as well as on the size of deals they undertake and the
takeover premium.
In both cases, we conduct our analysis for the full sample and for a subsample that
includes only the deals for which cash was used as the method of payment. First, we
run our analysis taking all the deals in our sample, regardless of the method of payment.
This full sample analysis is motivated by the fact that we are interested in comparing the
relative eagerness of different types of bidders to make a deal under varying financial
conditions, regardless of the fact that strategic buyers have greater flexibility in the
choice of the payment method. Second, we repeat the analysis considering only the
subsample of deals for which cash is the only means of payment to make sure that our
results are not driven in any significant way by the fact that strategic buyers can benefit
from using stocks as a means of payment when deals are larger in size or potential stock
mispricing is higher.13
IV.I Industry Level Analysis
We investigate first the link between financial sponsors’ M&A activity and credit avail-
ability, credit risk premia and stock market valuations by looking at the proportion of
financial sponsors related deal flow under varying conditions in financial markets. In
particular, our intuition is that if financial sponsors and strategic buyers were analo-
gously affected by credit availability, credit risk premium, and stock market valuations,
their corresponding deal flows would be synchronous. In other words, the number of
deals or the deal volume could vary over time, but the relative composition to the deal
flow would remain constant. On the contrary, a comparative lack or abundance of fi-
nancial sponsors related deal flow when valuations are particularly high or low or when
credit availability and credit risk premia are more or less favorable would be interpreted
as evidence of the impact of respectively pricing and debt market conditions on M&A
13Hansen (1987) presents a theory for the choice of exchange medium in mergers and acquisitions, arguing that when
uncertainty is higher, the bidder company prefers stock over cash in order to mitigate the overpayment risk. On the
empirical side, Faccio and Masulis (2005) find evidence with a sample of European companies that the target size is
negatively correlated with the proportion of cash used as a method of payment.
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activity by financial sponsors.
We construct our measures of financial sponsors activity annually FSNUM t,j and
FSV ALt,j by dividing the number or the value of all deals by financial sponsors in a
given industry over the total deal flow in the same industry, which we classify as follow-
ing: Basic Materials, Communications, Consumer-Cyclical, Consumer-Non Cyclical,
Energy, Industrials, Technology, and Utilities. We obtain a panel of 128 year-industry
observations, where the subscript t denotes the year of the transaction and j the indus-
try to which the target firm belongs and we model the contribution of financial sponsors
to total deal flow as a function of a vector of a set of financial variables:
Yj,t = a+ bXt + νj + ej,t (3.1)
Yj,t, the dependent variable, is either FSNUM t,j and FSV ALt,j. Our set of inde-
pendent variables includes: CreditAvailabilityt, which captures the varying conditions
on the markets for debt, CreditRiskPremiumt, which accounts for the extra cost that
high yield borrowers have to pay to raise debt and StockMarketV aluationst, which
captures the level of equity markets valuations. In particular, we proxy for the avail-
ability of credit by means of the euro area Euribor 3-month rate. High values of our
variable CreditAvailablilityt correspond to credit tightness, and vice versa. Then, with
the aim to consider the different costs of borrowing, we disentangle credit availability
from credit risk premium by looking at the spread between the annual yields offered
by the constituents of the Barclays Corporate European High Yield Bond Index over
those of the the FTSE Corporate European 10+ Maturity Bond Index. Keeping in
mind that high yield debt issuance is not exclusively but more intrinsically related to
financial sponsors, we consider higher values of our variable CreditRiskPremiumt to
correspond to a wider gap in the cost of borrowing for financial sponsors relative to
strategic buyers. Shifts in stock markets levels are measured on the basis of the Price
to Book ratio of the EUROSTOXX 50 index.14 Finally, νj are industry fixed effects at
14We choose to proxy for stock market valuations by means of the Price to Book ratio of the EUROSTOXX 50 to be
consistent with the country of origin of the bidders in our sample. Notice that the observations for the price to book
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the target level, when included.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables included in our analysis. We
observe substantial variation in our financial and macroeconomic variables over the
sample period. Indeed, the sample period comprises quite a few distinct intervals of
recognized turmoil and changing macroeconomic conditions. For example, that from
March 2000 to October 2002 characterized by a plunge of the stock markets due to the
Tech Bubble bursting, or the one following Lehman Brothers collapse in October 2008,
marked by unfavorable credit conditions combined with high investors’ uncertainty and
lower valuations, or the period following the adoption of quantitative easing, character-
ized instead by cheap credit paired with recovered investor confidence and high stock
market valuations.
—Insert Table 2 about here—
Results
In this section we present our main results and discuss the main findings of our industry
level analysis. We estimate our model by industry-level panel regressions.15 Each
panel in Table 3 reports the coefficients and clustered standard errors by industry (in
parenthesis) for four different alternative specifications of our model. In the first panel
the dependent variable is the fraction of deals by financial sponsors in a given industry
over the total deal flow in the same industry, measured in columns (1) and (2) on the
basis of the number of deals and in columns (3) and (4) on the basis of the value of
deals. In the second panel we repeat the analysis considering only the subsample of
deals for which cash is the only means of payment.
Our industry-level analysis uncovers substantial differences in the way in which finan-
cial sponsors and strategic buyers react to shifts in credit availability, borrowing costs
and stock market valuations. Indeed, our findings suggest that deal flows for different
ratio of the EUROSTOXX 50 were not available for the years 2001 and 2002 and therefore we complete the time series
by using the corresponding observations for the EUROSTOXX 600 index.
15We obtain analogous results by estimating a Tobit model of the fraction of financial sponsors in order to account
for the potential censoring of the dependent variables. Results are available upon request.
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types of buyers are not synchronous and the relative composition of deal flow changes
in response to varying market conditions. In particular, we find that the relative con-
tribution of financial sponsors to the total volume of deals grows when the availability
of credit increases and the yield spread narrows, while it reduces when stock market
valuations rise. These results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects that we use to
capture the within industry effects of varying market conditions on M&A activity by
financial sponsor and strategic buyers, taking into account intrinsic unobserved differ-
ences across industries, such as their different appeal to different types of bidders or
the fact that deals tend to cluster in time and industries.
Table 3 shows that when the Euribor rate gets higher, i.e. when credit availability
becomes scarcer, financial sponsors increase their share of the total deal flow. The cor-
responding coefficient is positive in all our specification but it is statistically significant,
at the 1% level, only for the regressions with the deal value. Shifts in debt market
conditions have a stronger economic impact on the relative contribution of financial
sponsors to the total volume of deals than the number of deals. In particular, a one
standard deviation increase in the Euribor rate corresponds to a 2.0% growth in the
relative contribution of financial sponsors to the number of deals and a 10.0% increase
in their share of aggregate deal value. The magnitude of these effects is respectively
2.0% and 10.7%, when we consider the subsample of deals for which cash is used as the
only means of payment.
This evidence is consistent with Martos-Vila et al. (2013) who find the same link
between financial sponsors activity and debt market conditions analyzing a sample
of deals for US public targets in the period between 1984 and 2005, as well as with
Haddad et al. (2013) that argues that more LBOs should occur when risk free rates
are high.16 In the case of the risk free rate, a simple discount rate argument would
not necessarily predict a relationship with the relative composition of deal flow, since it
affects the value of discounted cash flows of both financial and strategic buyers. Thus,
we interpret these results as evidence of a greater sensitivity of strategic buyers to
16Still, Haddad et al. (2013) consider only LBOs and not their relative contribution to the M&A activity as we do.
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credit availability. On the contrary, for financial sponsors leveraging up transactions is
part of their value creation strategy. Thus, this difference makes their response to debt
market conditions smoother and allows them to increase their relative contribution to
overall deal flow. Our interpretation is in line with Martynova and Renneboog (2009)
who show that strategic buyers mostly resort to debt funding to finance their external
growth and Harford (2005), who shows that overall liquidity in the debt markets or ease
of financing is a necessary condition for M&A activity by strategic buyers. Moreover,
Axelson et al. (2013) find that variations in the risk free rate do not affect buyout
leverage, while comparable publicly-traded firms decrease their leverage when the risk
free rate is high.
—Insert Table 3 about here—
The extra cost of borrowing that financial sponsors face as a results of the shorter
horizon and the highly leveraged capital structure of their investments affects their
relative contribution to deal flow in the opposite way. When the gap between the credit
risk premium of high yield and investment grade issuers widens, i.e. when the difference
between the borrowing of different types of buyers is larger, the relative contribution
of financial sponsors to overall deal flow drops, both with respect to the number of
deals and to deal values. The coefficient on the yield spread between high yield and
investment grade issuers is negative and significant in all our specifications, at the 1%
level when the number of deals is considered and at least at the 10% level for the value
of deals. The economic impact on the relative contribution of financial sponsors to the
total number and volume of deals is substantial. In particular, a one standard deviation
increase in the yield spread corresponds to a 2.0% drop in the relative contribution of
financial sponsors to the number of deals and a 3.5% drop in their share of aggregate
deal value. The magnitude of these effects is respectively -2.4% and -4.2% when we
consider the subsample of deals for which cash is used as the only means of payment.17
17We obtain similar results by substracting from the High Yield Bond Index the FTSE Corporate European All
Maturities Yield Bond Index and by substracting from the High Yield Bond Index an average yield index with ratings
from AAA to BBB (own calculations). Moreover, although the economic interpretation is different, we obtain similar
results by substracting from the High Yield Bond Index the Euribor 3-month rate. Results are available upon request.
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These results are in line with Martos-Vila et al. (2013), who find that financial sponsors
decrease their contribution to the overall M&A activity when their borrowing costs
increase and strategic buyers’ borrowing costs decrease.18
Finally, stock market valuations affect the relative contribution of financial sponsors
in a negative way. When stock market valuations are high, the relative contribution of
financial sponsors to overall deal flow drops, both with respect to the number of deals
and to deal values. The coefficient on the aggregate Price to Book ratio is negative and
significant at least at the 10% level, in all our specifications but one. Also in this case,
shifts in valuations have a substantial economic impact on the relative contribution of
financial sponsors to the total number and volume of deals. In particular, a one standard
deviation increase in the EUROSTOXX 50 index Price to Book ratio corresponds to a
2.7% drop in the relative contribution of financial sponsors to the number of deals and
a 5.4% drop in their share of aggregate deal value. The magnitude of these effects is
respectively -3.1% and -6.4% when we consider the subsample of deals for which cash
is used as the only means of payment.
Also these findings are consistent with the evidences provided by Martos-Vila et al.
(2013) who find the same link between financial sponsors activity and valuations. We
interpret the lack of financial sponsors-related deal flow when valuations are high as
evidence of their greater price responsiveness. Indeed an empirical study of Gorbenko
and Malenko (2014) shows that financial sponsors, who typically aim for a higher return
than strategic buyers to meet the expectations of their investors, are relatively more
reluctant to close deals at high valuations and less willing to contribute additional equity
to compete with rival bids by corporate buyers.19 In the first case, financial sponsors
would in fact erode the potential capital gain at exit while in the latter case they would
dilute their returns. Vice versa corporate buyers have relatively greater pricing power
as they can nonetheless afford to close deals at higher valuations: they usually require
18More in details, Martos-Vila et al. (2013) calculate the borrowing costs for financial sponsors as the High-yield
spread over the 5-year Treasury Yield and the borrowing costs for strategic buyers as the spread between the average
rate on commercial and industrial loans and the Federal Funds rate.
19In line with this argument, Bargeron et al. (2008) find that public target shareholders receive a 63% higher premium
when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm
78 CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL VS. STRATEGIG BUYERS: WHO IS WAITING AT THE GATE?
lower rates of return than financial sponsors and they can exploit potential synergies.20
IV.II Deal Level Analysis
In order to corroborate our industry level results we further analyze, at the individual
deal level, the effects of varying stock and debt market conditions on the likelihood of a
deal being backed by a financial sponsor or by a strategic buyer. Moreover, we link our
financial variables to the size of the deals they undertake and to the takeover premium
they offer. The purpose of this analysis is to shed additional light on the behavior
of financial sponsors and strategic buyers under varying market conditions and more
specifically to explore different channels through which credit availability, borrowing
costs and stock market valuations affect the composition of deal flow. In particular, we
are interested in seeing whether the effects that we observe are the result of a crowding
out of one type of buyer by the other in a competitive setting or they are rather the
consequence of a change in the preferred size of deals undertaken by different types of
buyers.
To the extent that targets in our sample are representative of the entire set of invest-
ment opportunities of financial sponsors, we can get further insight on the willingness of
financial sponsors to acquire a company under varying conditions in financial markets
by looking at the odds with which a target in our sample gets acquired by a financial
sponsor rather than a strategic buyer across periods characterized by different levels
of credit availability and valuations. In particular, if financial market conditions were
to affect financial sponsors and strategic buyers in the same way, we would expect the
odds of a target being acquired by a financial sponsor rather than a strategic buyer
to stay constant over time. On the contrary, a rise or fall of the odds ratio would be
interpreted as evidence of the adverse or favourable impact of pricing and debt market
conditions on M&A activity by financial sponsors.
We test whether the odds of observing a deal at a given point in time being backed
20Although we have in our sample both listed and unlisted targets and buyers, this drop in the relative contribution
of financial sponsors is also in line with the argument of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004) that identify stock market valuations as a trigger of M&A activity for strategic buyers as overvalued acquirers
driven by greater perceived synergies bid more and overvalued targets are more willing to accept takeover offers.
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by a financial sponsor vary significantly as a consequence of shifts in credit availability,
credit risk premia or valuations by means of the following logit model:
logit(Yi,j,t) = log(
yi,j,t
1− yi,j,t ) = a+ bXt + νj + ei,j,t (3.2)
Yi,t,j in this case is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is backed by
a financial sponsors and 0 if it is backed by a strategic buyer. As per our industry-level
analysis, independent variables include: CreditAvailabilityt, which captures the vary-
ing conditions on the markets for debt, CreditRiskPremiumt, which accounts for the
extra cost that high yield borrowers have to pay to raise debt, StockmarketV aluationst,
which captures the level of equity markets valuations and νj are target industry fixed
effects.
Then, in the same spirit, we test whether the deal size or the takeover premium
offered by financial or strategic buyers vary significantly as a consequence of shifts in
stock market valuations and debt market conditions with the following linear model:
Yi,j,t = a+ bXt + νj + ei,j,t (3.3)
Yi,t,j is respectively the deal value (logarithmic transformation) or the takeover pre-
mium offered. A comparative growth or decline in the takeover premium may ex-
plain variations in the relative proportion of deals undertaken by financial sponsors and
strategic buyers, while variations of the corresponding shares of deal volumes between
financial sponsors and strategic buyers may be the consequence of a comparative growth
or reduction in the deal size.
Results
In this section we present the main results and discuss the main findings of our analysis
at deal level. Each panel in Table 4 reports the coefficients and standard errors (in
parenthesis, clustered by industry) for our models estimation. In particular, in Panel
A we consider all deals in our sample, independently of the method of payment, while
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Panel B reports our models estimates for a subsample including only deals settled by
means of cash payment.21
—Insert Table 4 about here—
Column (1) reports the estimates of our logit model with industry-level fixed effects
for the odds of observing a deal at a given point in time being backed by a financial
sponsor rather than a strategic buyer. We find that, consistent with our evidences at
the industry level, a larger yield spread between high yield and investment grade issuers
negatively affects M&A activity by financial sponsors. Indeed, the likelihood that an
acquisition is backed by a financial sponsor drops when the extra cost of borrowing for
financial sponsors relative to strategic buyers increases. The coefficient on the yield
spread is negative and significant at the 1% level. In particular, over the entire sample,
for a standard deviation increase in the yield spread the log odds of a deal being
backed by a financial sponsor drop by approximately 1/3, or equivalently a 3.0% drop
in its likelihood when variables are set to their means. The effects are similar when
we consider cash bids only. For a standard deviation increase in the yield spread the
log odds of a deal being backed by a financial sponsor drop by approximately 1/3, or
equivalently a 3.5% drop in its likelihood when variables are set to their means.
This evidence confirms our interpretation that financial sponsors’ M&A activity is
affected by their higher borrowing costs relative to strategic buyers: when increasing
yield spread reduces the benefits of financial leverage, the likelihood of a deal being
backed by a financial sponsor declines. As a consequence, strategic buyers with higher
pricing power crowd out financial sponsors from the market for corporate control.
With the aim to further understand the results of our logit model, in Column (2)
and Column (3) we report OLS regression estimates of the takeover premium over
our variables of interest for the subsamples of deals respectively backed by financial
sponsors and strategic buyers. We find that the yield spread has a substantial effect on
the takeover premium of deals backed by strategic buyers, but not for those backed by
21In Panel A we have 11 deals backed by financial sponsors for which the method of payment is undisclosed (8 deals)
or a combination of stock and cash (3 deals). As shown in Panel B, when excluding these 11 deals, results do not change.
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financial sponsors. Wald tests of parameters across regressions (2) and (3) reject the null
hypothesis of equivalent effects across subsamples at the 1% level. The corresponding
coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance
a one standard deviation increase in the yield spread corresponds to a 5.4% increase
in the takeover premium which would be equivalent to approximately an increase by
$43 million for the average deal in our sample. The magnitude of this effect is 4.8%
when we consider the subsample of deals for which cash is used as the only means of
payment, which would correspond to approximately an increase of $39 million for the
average deal in our sample.
Our findings may be interpreted as following: on the one hand, strategic buyers may
increase the takeover premium they offer when the yield spread widens because they
bid more aggressively. On the other hand, the takeover premium may increase as a
consequences of decreasing target prices. Interestingly, when we regress the Equity to
Book Value transaction multiple over our three variables of interests for the strategic
buyers’ subsample, we don’t find any significant relation between the Equity to Book
Value multiple and the yield spread. Thus, the observed positive relation between the
yield spread and the takeover premium is not due to the fact that strategic buyers bid
more aggressively (with respect to the book value), but is rather due to the fact that
stock market prices are decreasing and the takeover premium is consequently higher.22
Therefore, the crowding out effect we observe at the industry level (the relative number
of deals of strategic buyers increases when the yield spread increases), which is further
confirmed by our deal level analysis, does not depend on the bidding aggressiveness
of strategic buyers; financial sponsors ”participate” less to the M&A market, probably
because it’s more costly for them to finance their deals with external debt.
While the odds of a deal being backed by financial sponsors and strategic buyers
respond to the yield spread, they do not seem to differ in their responsiveness to shifts
in credit availability and stock market valuations (Column (1)). The corresponding
22These results are consistent with our findings in Table 4, Panel A, considering the whole sample: the takeover
premium paid by strategic buyers increases when the Price to Book ratio decreases
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coefficients are of the expected sign but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
different types of buyers are equally affected by stock or debt market conditions, as the
odds of a deal being backed by a financial sponsor remain constant over time.
One possible explanation could be that at the deal level many additional target- or
deal-specific variables may combine to determine the likelihood of a deal being backed
by a financial sponsor or strategic buyer together with financial market conditions.
Indeed, the potential growth of the target or the level of the expected synergies; as
well as how long it would take to reap the benefits of improved performance or the
gains from the realization of the synergies; or the capacity of the target to service the
additional debt burden are just a few examples of variables that could alter the appeal
of a deal to different types of buyers. Therefore, unobserved deal level characteristics
may then offset the impact of financial market conditions on the likelihood of a deal
being backed by a financial sponsor or strategic buyer.
An alternative explanation could be that shifts in credit availability and stock mar-
ket valuations affect the relative contribution of financial sponsors to M&A deal flow
through changes in the size of deals undertaken by different types of buyers rather than
by their willingness to realize a transaction. In order to explore this channel and recon-
cile our deal-level analysis with results at the industry level, Column (4) and Column
(5) report OLS regression estimates of deal size over our variables of interest for the sub-
samples of deals respectively backed by financial sponsors and strategic buyers. Indeed,
we find that credit availability and stock market valuation have substantial effects on
the size of deals backed by strategic buyers, but not for those backed by financial spon-
sors. More specifically, for increasing Price to Book ratio the coefficient for financial
sponsors is also positive yet not significative. These observed features may be the con-
sequence, at least partially, of mechanical effect: in fact, when stock market valuations
increase, deal size shall increase to some extent mechanically too. Wald tests of param-
eters across regressions (4) and (5) reject the null hypothesis of equivalent effects across
subsamples at the 1% level. Moreover, financially constrained strategic buyers reduce
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the size of the deals they undertake when available credit is scarcer. The corresponding
coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance
a one standard deviation increase in the Euribor rate corresponds to a 13.2% reduction
in deal size which would be equivalent to approximately a drop of $107 million for the
average deal in our sample. The magnitude of this effect is 20.9% when we consider
the subsample of deals for which cash is used as the only means of payment, which
would correspond to a drop of approximately $169 million for the average deal in our
sample. The size of deals backed by strategic buyers increases instead with higher stock
market valuations. The corresponding coefficient is positive and significant at the 1%
level. In terms of economic significance a one standard deviation increase in the Price
to Book ratio corresponds to a 19.5% growth in deal size which would be equivalent to
approximately a rise of $158 million for the average deal in our sample. The magnitude
of these effect is 30.9% when we consider the subsample of deals for which cash is used
as the only means of payment, which would correspond to approximately an increase
of $251 million for the average deal in our sample.
IV.III Discussion of results
Overall the results of our empirical analysis suggest that deal flows for different types of
buyers are not synchronous and the relative composition of deal flow changes in response
to varying market conditions. In particular, we find that the relative contribution of
financial sponsors to the total volume of deals grows when the availability of credit
increases and when the gap in the cost of borrowing for financial sponsors narrows,
while it reduces when stock market valuations rise. Thus, evidence is consistent with
our first and second hypotheses as both types of bidders respond to shifts in their cost
of borrowing but financial sponsors seem less sensitive than strategic buyers to overall
credit tightness. On the other hand, though, evidence suggests that financial sponsors
seem more price sensitive as their inability to exploit synergies limits their pricing power
compared to strategic buyers, in line with our third hypothesis.
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However, while the yield spread affects the relative willingness of financial sponsors
and strategic buyers to embark on a transaction, credit availability and stock market
valuations affect the size of deals realized by different types of buyers. In particular,
our results are consistent with a framework in which financial sponsors reduce their
appetite for deals when their borrowing costs relative to strategic buyers increase, as
their returns from leveraging up transactions reduce and due to their limited ability
to adjusts takeover premiums upwards to match those offered by strategic buyers. On
the other hand, credit availability does not seem to affect the relative propensity of
different buyers to realize a transaction but rather the size of the deals by strategic
buyers. In particular, when credit is abundant strategic buyers become less financially
constrained and target larger deals. Conversely, when credit is scarce financially con-
strained strategic buyers refocus their M&A activity on smaller deals. As far as stock
market valuations are concerned, also in this case target firm valuations do not seem
to affect the relative propensity of different buyers to realize a transaction but rather
the size of the deals targeted by strategic buyers. Indeed, high valuations boost com-
paratively more the value of deals realized by strategic buyers that, as shown in Table
2, pay on average larger takeover premiums.
V Conclusions
Financial sponsors activity has represented an integral part of the European and global
economy in the last three decades. Still, in the past years financial sponsors related
deal flow has been relatively modest if compared with total M&A activity. This is
surprising when looking at some of M&A’s fundamental determinants, as availability
of credit, economic growth and stock markets performance. Financial and strategic
buyers differ over several dimensions and have different strategic goals. In this paper
we have analyzed why the portion of financial buyers over total deal making activity
varies in the time series. In particular, we have linked financial sponsors and strategic
buyers activity to credit availability, credit risk premia and stock market valuations in
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an effort to shed light on their possibly conflicting effects on the composition of deal
flow. This question is important because the effect on corporations eventually acquired
or merged differ depending upon the bidder type.
We have shown within an euro area sample several non trivial implications related
to the competition of financial sponsors and strategic buyers. The picture that emerges
from our analysis confirms our intuition that there is a conflict between the pressure
to invest and the pressure not to overpay and that financial sponsors and strategic
buyers are differently influenced by these two forces. Indeed, possibly because of the
pressure to invest and the need to lever up transactions to achieve the high returns
required by their investors, financial sponsors are relatively slow to react to credit
availability, while their short term investment horizon combined with their inability to
capture synergies make them relatively more responsive to high company valuations,
as overpayment would hinder their returns. Intuitively, we also find that increasing
differential borrowing costs between financial sponsors and strategic buyers benefit the
latter in the market for corporate control.
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Table 3.1: Deals characteristics
This table reports summary statisics on the deal characteristics for the whole sample and for subsamples
of deals realized respectively by strategic buyers and financial sponsors. Transaction size represents the
value of the deal as announced in EUR million. Cash payment represents the fraction of deals which is
settled only by means of cash. It is based on an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if cash is the
only means of payment and 0 otherwise. Premium represents the percentage difference between the
offer price and the undisturbed market price of the target before the announcement, Ev/Ebitda is the
ratio between Transaction Value and the Trailing 12 months Ebitda, and EqV-to-B is the ratio between
Equity Market Value and Equity Book Value. The variables Takeover premium, TV/Ebitda and EqV-
to-B have been winsorized at the 2.5% level on both sides to drop outliers. T-tests of differences in
deal characterstics across subsamples of deals realized by strategic buyers and financial sponsors are
shown in the last row of each Panel. The superscripts *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels respectively.
Panel A: Transaction size
N Mean Median StDev Min Max
All sample 2560 812.2 160.0 3130.4 32.0 73304.8
Strategic Buyers 2302 807.7 159.4 3109.3 32.0 73304.8
Financial Sponsors 258 852.5 170.2 3319.2 35.0 36768.1
Differences across buyer types -44.8
Panel B: Cash payment
All sample 2560 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Strategic Buyers 2302 0.73 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
Financial Sponsors 258 0.96 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
Differences across buyer types -0.23***
Panel C: Takeover premium
All sample 709 27.5% 22.8% 26.6% -14.7% 107.2%
Strategic Buyers 669 28.1% 23.2% 27.2% -14.7% 107.2%
Financial Sponsors 40 17.2% 18.8% 15.7% -5.1% 47.3%
Differences across buyer types 10.8***
Panel D: EV/EBITDA
All sample 660 14.5 10.1 15.8 2.0 84.9
Strategic Buyers 616 14.8 10.2 16.2 2.0 84.9
Financial Sponsors 44 10.1 9.1 5.5 3.2 26.0
Differences across buyer types 4.7*
Panel E: EqV-to-B
All sample 870 4.8 2.7 6.1 0.6 32.0
Strategic Buyers 789 4.5 2.7 5.7 0.6 32.0
Financial Sponsors 81 7.1 3.4 8.9 0.7 32.0
Differences across buyer types -2.6***
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics and correlations
Panel A of this table reports summary statistics of our independent variables. CreditAvailabilityt is
proxied by the end of the year Euro area Euribor 3-month rate, provided by a panel of banks from
EU countries and international banks. CreditRiskPremiumt is proxied by the High Yield spread
over the Corporate Bond Yield, which is calculated as the difference between the Barclays Corporate
European High Yield Bond Index and the FTSE Corporate European with 10+ Years Maturity Yield
Bond Index. StockV aluationst is proxied by the Price to Book ratio of the EUROSTOXX 50 index.
Since Datastream does not provide the observation for the year 2000, we complement the series with
the EUROSTOXX 600 Price to Book ratio. Panel B of this table reports correlations among our
independent variables over our sample period.
Panel A: summary statistics
Variable: Mean Median StDev Min Max
Credit Availability 2.09% 2.16 1.62% -0.13% 4.94%
Credit Risk Premium 5.78% 3.59 4.95% 1.60% 20.47%
Stock Market Valuations 1.95 1.89 0.64 1.05 3.14
Panel B: correlations
Credit Credit Stock
Availability Risk Market
Premium Valuations
Credit Availability 1
Credit Risk Premium 0.4353 1
Stock Market Valuations 0.8603 0.5178 1
V. CONCLUSIONS 89
Table 3.3: Model estimation, Industry level
This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of industry-level panel regressions
with clustered standard errors at the industry level of a model that, when it includes industry fixed
effects, has the following form: Yj,t = a+ bXt + νj + ej,t. In Panel A we consider all the deals in our
sample, independently of the payment method. In Panel B we consider deals for which cash is the only
means of payment. In the first two columns of each panel the dependent variable is the fraction of
deals by financial sponsors in a given industry over the total deal flow in the same industry measured
on the basis of the number of deals. In the last two columns the dependent variable is instead the
fraction of deals by financial sponsors in a given industry over the deals in the same industry measured
on the basis of the value of deals. CreditAvailabilityt is proxied by the end of the year Euro area
Euribor 3-month rate as provided by the European Central Bank. CreditRiskPremiumt is proxied
by the High Yield spread over the Corporate Bond Yield, which is calculated as the difference between
the Barclays Corporate European High Yield Bond Index and the FTSE Corporate European with
10+ Years Maturity Yield Bond Index. StockV aluationst is proxied by the Price to Book ratio of
the EUROSTOXX 50 index. Since Datastream does not provide the observation for the year 2000,
we complement the series with the EUROSTOXX 600 Price to Book ratio. All regressions include a
constant term (unreported). The superscripts *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Availability 1.2468 1.2468 6.1772*** 6.1772***
(0.8205) (0.7801) (2.0347) (2.3747)
Credit Risk Premium -0.4084*** -0.4084*** -0.6987** -0.6987*
(0.1469) (0.1684) (0.3466) (0.4221)
Stock Market Valuations -4.2664* -4.2664 -8.4628** -8.4628*
(2.3995) (2.9532) (4.2087) (4.5688)
Industry FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 128 128 128 128
R2 0.0760 0.0975 0.1488 0.1629
Panel B: Cash only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Availability 1.2507 1.2507 6.6147*** 6.6147***
(0.9585) (0.8852) ( 2.3203) (2.5934)
Credit Risk Premium -0.4864*** -0.4864*** -0.8507** -0.8507*
(0.1731) (0.1889) (0.3793) (0.4743)
Stock Market Valuations -4.7835* -4.7835 -9.9848** -9.9848*
(2.7725) (3.6051) (4.9800) (5.5506)
Industry FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 128 128 128 128
R2 0.0702 0.0896 0.1212 0.1366
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Table 3.4: Model estimation, Deal Level
This table reports coefficients, Wald test values (in parenthesis in column 1) and t-stats (in parenthesis
in columns 2 to 5) of our deal level analysis. Standard errors are clustered by industry. In Panel A we
consider all the deals in our sample, independently of the payment method. In Panel B we consider deals
for which cash is the only means of payment. In column (1) we estimate a deal-level logit regressions
with industry fixed effects of the following model: Yi,j,t = a+ bXt + νj + ei,j,t. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is backed by a financial sponsor and 0 if
it is backed by a strategic buyer. In columns (2) to (5) we estimate the following linear model with
ordinary least squares (OLS) and industry fixed effects: Yi,j,t = a + bXt + νj + ei,j,t. In column (2)
and (3) the dependent variable is the takeover premium over the trading price at the announcement
date, while in column (4) and (5) the dependent variable is the logaritmic transformation of the deal
size. In columns (2) and (4) we analyze the subsample of deals for which the acquirer is a financial
sponsor, while in columns (3) and (5) we analyze the subsample of deals for which the acquirer is a
strategic buyer. CreditAvailabilityt is proxied by the end of the year Euro area Euribor 3-month rate
as provided by the European Central Bank. CreditRiskPremiumt is proxied by the High Yield spread
over the Corporate Bond Yield, which is calculated as the difference between the Barclays Corporate
European High Yield Bond Index and the FTSE Corporate European with 10+ Years Maturity Yield
Bond Index. StockV aluationst is proxied by the Price to Book ratio of the EUROSTOXX 50 index.
Since Datastream does not provide the observation for the year 2000, we complement the series with
the EUROSTOXX 600 Price to Book ratio. All regressions include a constant term (unreported). The
superscripts *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit Availability 0.0458 -1.6554 0.5517 0.1459 -0.0812***
(0.0696) (1.5407) 1.1822 (0.0898) (0.0211)
Credit Risk Premium -0.0756*** -0.7192 1.0856*** 0.0106 -0.0094
(0.0197) (0.9356) (0.2659) (0.0136) (0.0083)
Stock Market Valuations -0.1339 1.5738 -4.8612* 0.1935 0.3040***
(0.2295) (3.9015) (2.8710) (0.3047) (0.0567)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2560 40 669 258 2302
R2 0.0459 0.2287 0.0645 0.1133 0.0333
Panel B: Cash only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit Availability 0.0085 -1.6554 -0.1242 0.1311 -0.1288***
(0.0676) (1.5407) (1.0808) (0.0954) (0.0253)
Credit Risk Premium -0.0695*** -0.7192 0.9704*** 0.0113 -0.0117
(0.0180) (0.9356) (0.2622) (0.0124) (0.0082)
Stock Market Valuations -0.0317 1.5738 -2.6327 0.1967 0.4829***
(0.2162) (3.9015) (2.6627) (0.3265) 0.0647
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1932 40 509 247 1685
R2 0.0433 0.2287 0.0675 0.1093 0.0364
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